

Section 2.

PHILOSOPHICAL AESTHETICS AND
AESTHETIC RESEARCH

PHILOSOPHISCHE ÄSTHETIK

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The Distinction Between Aesthetics and Sociology of Art

Remarks on Bourdieu's Critique of Aesthetics

Pierre Bourdieu is without doubt one of the most influential sociologists of culture and art. In several publications, notably in his *magnum opus*, *Distinction A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste*, and in the collection of essays *The Field of Cultural Production* he has subjected aesthetics and traditional art history to a searching critique.

Since the heading "aesthetics" covers a great variety of theoretical and practical pursuits it may be useful to make a few distinctions in order to obtain a clearer view of Bourdieu's critique. The analysis of artistic programmes and ideologies and the study of the history of art and the history of criticism are all part of the broad conception of aesthetics which includes all kinds of theoretical and historical interest in the arts. But "aesthetics" can also be equated with the philosophy of art, as is often the case in the Anglo-Saxon world. But even if we define aesthetics as philosophical aesthetics, that is, as the philosophy of art, we have not made things much clearer since the philosophy of art can also be many things, or, as the evil spirit says in the Scriptures, "my name is legion".

When I speak of philosophical aesthetics or the philosophy of art I have in mind the analysis of fundamental concepts in the discourses on art, such as the concept of art itself, the concept of the aesthetic, genre concepts, stylistic categories and the like. Questions concerning the ontological and epistemological status of works of art, the analysis of the role and nature of interpretation and problems concerning the evaluation and appreciation of art are also part of the philosophy of art.

I

Bourdieu claims that aesthetics or the philosophy of art is inherently ahistorical and anti-sociological. Practically all philosophers of art, Bourdieu believes, attempt to unravel the timeless structures of art, exploring the ontology of works of art as if art had an immutable, timeless essence. "[A]ll philosophical thought that is worthy of the name" is "totally ahistorical", Bourdieu writes

when discussing Kant's aesthetics in the Postscript to his *Distinction* (Bourdieu 1986:493). In other words, the philosophy of art is committed to what Anita Silvers has called "traditionalism", the view that works of art remain the same throughout history regardless of how we as historical subjects view them (Silvers 1991). According to this view works of art are ontologically stable objects with an immutable essence.

In an interesting article, "Art, Historicism, and Knowledge", Simo Säätelä opposes "traditionalism" to "revisionism", according to which the categories of *art* and *the aesthetic* are socially and culturally constructed categories (Säätelä 1993). The first point I wish to make is that Bourdieu identifies the philosophy of art with a traditionalist position and that he does not take anti-essentialist, pragmatic and "revisionist" aesthetics into consideration. It could of course be said, that "revisionism" with its relativistic implications ignores the categories of art and the aesthetic altogether and that it therefore cannot be regarded as a philosophy of art in the proper sense. Aesthetics without an ontologically secure work of art may seem like love without kisses, theology without god, or Marxism without a working class. I have deliberately formulated two sharply opposing options, although things are not so clear-cut in reality: many contemporary aestheticians take up positions somewhere in between the extremes of traditionalism and revisionism. Bourdieu nevertheless believes that philosophical aesthetics cannot be anything but ahistorical, and therefore deeply suspect:

The pure thinker, by taking as the subject of reflection his or her own experience . . . , without focusing on the historicity of his reflection and the historicity of that reflection and the historicity of the object to which it is applied . . . , unwittingly establishes this singular experience as a transhistorical norm for every aesthetic perception. (Bourdieu 1987:255)

Two comments are relevant here. Firstly, it is not clear how an awareness of the historicity of one's reflection actually affects, or how it should affect, one's attitude and one's approach to art. Secondly, Bourdieu takes for granted the assumption that there are no transhistorical norms in aesthetic matters. It is moreover by no means clear that those who believe that art is a universal phenomenon must also believe in transhistorical norms. The traditionalist's conviction that art is in some sense universal is not absurd, for it is reasonable to believe that cultural and historical variations in the human response to beauty in art and nature are somehow grounded in human nature. Our aesthetic responses may be based on a common need for order and organization, for example, which manifests itself in different ways under different circumstances, but this possibility is

ruled out from the start by Bourdieu.

If what Bourdieu calls pure aesthetics is an impossibility since it is simply the sociological and ideological reflex of a certain cultured taste characteristic of a specific social class, how then should we study art without self-congratulation and without ideological blinkers? Bourdieu answers that

one must replace the ontological question with the historical question of the genesis of the universe, that is, the artistic field, within which, through a veritable continuous creation, the value of the work is endlessly produced and reproduced. (Bourdieu 1987:259)

Studying the "genesis of the universe", the genesis of the artistic field and the emergence of the modern artworld is not, however, the same thing as studying and analyzing works of art. Bourdieu's answer implies that there is something suspect about studying works of art as such; taking works of art seriously is a sign of an ahistorical attitude and the result of ideological blindness. Instead we are asked to take the emergence of the artistic field seriously, presumably because the field is amenable to objective, sociological analysis, whereas apparently the works of art themselves are not. According to Bourdieu explanations in art history and in the history of literature are "necessarily inadequate since the *essential* [my italics] explanation of each work lies outside each of them, in the objective relations which constitute this field (Bourdieu 1983a:30). Bourdieu's approach, which gives precedence to sociological explanation of works of art at the expense of explicative and thematic interpretation,¹ which are forms of explanation, is unacceptable. Explanation and interpretation take many forms and their adequacy or otherwise must be judged in relation to the purposes they are intended to serve.

Bourdieu also seems to misrepresent those approaches to art that he wishes to repudiate. "[T]he formalist ambition's objection to all types of historicization rests on the unawareness of its own social conditions of possibility" he claims and adds, for good measure, that "[t]he same is true of a philosophical aesthetics which records and ratifies this ambition (Bourdieu 1987:266).

It is not true that all formalists rejected *all* types of historicization. Jan Mukarovsky, for example, explicitly recognized the historical dimension, and the less dogmatic formalists and structuralists viewed their principles of analysis as methodological principles, not as ontological ones. To engage in formalist or

¹ Explicative interpretations are answers to the question *what* something is, not *why* something is as it is or *why* it occurs (See Von Wright 1971, ch. 4). Thematic interpretations answer questions about the meaning(s) of a work of art.

structuralist analysis does not necessarily imply the rejection of the historicity of art. It must also be said that Bourdieu's belief that there is an intimate connection between formalism and philosophical aesthetics is unfounded.

To clarify one of the main problems with Bourdieu's analysis of philosophical aesthetics, let me take an example from a different area, the history of science. Nobody, I think, would deny that there are "social conditions of possibility" of modern natural science. The history of science can point to several cultural and social factors that facilitated the rise of modern science: the Protestant ethic (if we are to believe Max Weber), the waning of feudalism and the rise of a new, educated, middle-class, etc.

It also seems quite obvious that there are many social conditions of possibility for contemporary natural science, such as vast state funding, the existence of advanced experimental technology, international communication systems, science education in schools and colleges. Is anybody tempted to argue that experimental research is prejudiced and that the results of research in the natural sciences are unacceptable because experimental scientists do not normally reflect on these background factors and because their results are formulated in an objective, tenseless language, and not properly historicized and relativized? Of course, it could be argued that there is a fundamental difference between science and aesthetics in that the former is capable of achieving objective results whereas the latter cannot claim any similar achievements. Even if this were true, it would still not prove that philosophical aesthetics is illegitimate. If sociological explanations are relevant in the case of aesthetics, they are equally relevant in the case of natural science, and if sociological explanations are believed to undermine or relativize the validity of philosophical positions, they must presumably have the same effect on scientific results. In saying that they have the same effects in both cases, one is implying that if they do not undermine the validity of scientific theories, neither do they vitiate the results of philosophical inquiry.

These reflections lead to the following question: what is the scientific and philosophical status of Bourdieu's sociology of art and culture? Bourdieu describes his project as a "critique of intellectualism which is at one and the same time epistemological and sociological . . . leading to the relativization of all intellectual production" (Bourdieu 1983b:5). In another place he remarks that "[s]ociology has the particular characteristic that sociologists are apparently condemned to sociologism, to relativism" (Bourdieu 1992:47). If Bourdieu's assumption is correct he has put himself in a precarious position, for it follows from his own principles that the status of sociology as a science is imperiled.

Far from seeing sociologism, which he wrongly equates with relativism, as a threat to his own discipline, Bourdieu regards it as a strength: "[S]ociology has the extraordinary privilege of having an instrument of knowledge which can be applied to itself" (Bourdieu 1992:47). If Bourdieu is willing to envisage a sociological explanation of his own sociology, thereby relativizing it, he cannot without contradicting himself at the same time maintain that his sociology of culture is scientific. Relativism is endemic to sociology and to the new discipline of cultural studies, but the problem of relativism is seldom faced squarely or treated adequately by sociologists and cultural theorists. Bourdieu is no exception, for he claims that "[i]n order to escape history . . . there is no other way than to historicize", because "historicization, which apparently relativizes, is a way of avoiding relativity" (Bourdieu 1992:38). He does not give any arguments in support of this unclear and contentious statement. He seems, in fact, to be claiming that by relativizing knowledge claims you can avoid relativity, which is like saying: "The only way to avoid alcoholism is to drink as much as possible as often as possible."

To illustrate my problem with Bourdieu and the way in which he deals with theoretical claims opposed to his own views, consider what he says about the debate on explanation and understanding in the philosophy of science, the so-called *Erklären-Verstehen* controversy. He claims that "the opposition between explanation and understanding had ideological functions in order to defend the identity of the humanities against the rise of the natural sciences" (Bourdieu 1992:41), which may be true, but is irrelevant to the assessment of the validity and fruitfulness of the opposition between explanation and understanding. Bourdieu, however, is convinced that this opposition is "a very great obstacle to the unification of epistemology, since it gives rise to the problem of 'unified science' and to the 'particularity' of the human sciences" (Bourdieu 1992:41). This view can be discussed and assessed rationally, but Bourdieu does not grant the supporters of a dualistic philosophy of science the same opportunity, since he assumes without argument that "the opposition between explanation and understanding had ideological functions". Once more Bourdieu dismisses a philosophical position with sociologistic assertions, instead of giving arguments against the views he rejects.

Bourdieu's view of rationality and the scope of rational discussion seems to me to be narrow and restrictive. In an interview he cheerfully admits that his aesthetic taste is typical for persons of station (Bourdieu 1980:88). Although disarmingly honest, this admission implies that aesthetic judgments are entirely determined by social status and therefore not amenable to rational argument.

Paul Crowther's remark that in Bourdieu's theory "individual agency is reduced to sets of relations which in turn can be reduced to other sets of relations" (Crowther 1994:168) seems apt.

Bourdieu is mistaken when he claims that philosophical aesthetics is by necessity ahistorical since in his view it operates with concepts and conceptions wrongly believed to be eternal. Many contemporary aestheticians espouse some kind of historically oriented philosophical aesthetics. For Bourdieu the status of philosophical aesthetics seems to be a question of all or nothing: aesthetics is either ahistorical and therefore illusory or it is historicizing and relativist and therefore strictly speaking not aesthetics. Fortunately, we do not have to choose between the Scylla of a rigid ahistorical aesthetics and the Charybdis of a toothless relativism. There is a third way, which has been elaborated by Kjell S. Johannessen and Richard Shusterman among others.

II

In conclusion I wish to make a few suggestions about the course I believe aesthetics should take. In *The Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein compares our language to a city:

Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (PI § 18)

Implicit in Wittgenstein's simile of language as a city is the idea of change and transformation. Artistic practices also change over time, due to complicated inner-artistic as well as extra-artistic processes. It is the task of the aesthetician to describe and analyze the conceptual background and the categorical framework, in which artistic practices and works of art exist.

The emergence of the modern artworld and its subsequent transformations are intimately connected with conceptual change. I therefore think that the most fruitful approach for philosophical aesthetics to adopt is what might be called a historically informed conceptual analysis.

Art and aesthetic experience are not necessary for our survival as individuals, nor for the survival of the human race. But man is not only a *zoon politikon*, he is also a *zoon symbolikon*. Art and aesthetic experience have taken many forms from the dawn of history to our postmodern time. Images, words, and sounds are part of the fabric of human life. Art as we know it is not eternal, but the need for symbolization and expression seems to be. This need is realized in

a multitude of ways at different times and in different cultures. Aesthetics is the rational reflection on the possibility and importance of art.

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"Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins" Wittgenstein als Architekt

"Wenn wir Häuser bauen, sprechen und schreiben wir."¹ Diese Worte stammen von einem Philosophen, dessen Lebenswerk - bahnbrechend für das 20. Jahrhundert - der Analyse der Sprache als Mittel zum Verständnis der Welt gewidmet war. Die Sprache bedarf aber der Wahrnehmung und damit der Dimension der Ästhetik. Gerade diese Dimension verknüpft Wittgenstein im "Tractatus" - weit über einen bloßen linguistic turn hinausreichend - mit fundamentalen Fragen der Ethik. Die Relation zwischen Ästhetik und Ethik aber zählt gegenwärtig angesichts der drohenden Gefahren einer "Anästhetisierung" (Wolfgang Iser) zu den besonders diskutierten Fragen der Philosophie.²

Ludwig Wittgenstein philosophierte aber nicht nur, sondern war in der Mitte der zwanziger Jahre in Wien als Architekt tätig. In dem von ihm in der Wiener Kundmannngasse für seine Schwester Margarete Stonborough-Wittgenstein erbauten Palais gehen Architektur und Philosophie eine in der Kulturgeschichte wohl einmalige Verbindung ein; Denken und Handeln werden hier - möglicherweise wie sonst nirgendwo - in unmittelbarer Interdependenz sichtbar.

Das Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein entsteht in einer für Wittgensteins Leben äußerst brisanten Phase: 1918 hatte er den "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" endgültig niedergeschrieben, von dem er glaubte, die Philosophie zu Ende gebracht zu haben. Für Wittgensteins äußeren Lebensweg war die Philosophie tatsächlich für über ein Jahrzehnt zu Ende - erst 1928/29 kehrte er bekanntlich zur Philosophie zurück und ging nach Cambridge, wo er seine Spätphilosophie entfaltete. Wittgensteins Philosophie entwickelte sich von der Anschauung der Abbildungsfunktion der Sprache im "Tractatus" zur Theorie des Funktionierens von Zeichen in umfassenden Systemen in den "Philosophischen Untersuchungen". Es lassen sich also zwei deutliche Phasen in der Ausbildung des Denkens Wittgensteins differenzieren, die zahlreiche Kommentatoren als tiefe Kluft deuten. In jener Zeit, in der sich Wittgenstein anscheinend von der Philosophie zurückgezogen hatte, errichtet er das Palais in der Wiener Kundmannngasse. Dieser

¹ Wittgenstein, L. 1968 Vorlesungen und Gespräche über Ästhetik, Psychologie und Religion, hrsg. v. C. Barrett, Göttingen, 21, Anm. 3

² Wulf, C., Kamper, D., Gumbrecht, H.U. (ed.) 1994 *Ethik der Ästhetik (Acta humaniora)* Berlin

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Phase, in der sich Wittgenstein intensiv mit Fragen architektonischer Gestaltung beschäftigte, muß eine bisher unbeachtete Relevanz für die Entwicklung der Spätphilosophie zukommen, so daß sich die Frage stellt, welche Rolle der Bau des Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein bei der Ausbildung des Denkens Ludwig Wittgensteins spielte.

Fragen drängen sich auf:

- Hat Wittgenstein die Thesen des "Tractatus" in Architektur umgesetzt, obwohl er glaubte, seine philosophische Mission sei beendet?
- Konnte das Palais unabhängig von der Philosophie entstehen, obwohl Wittgenstein im "Tractatus" Ästhetik mit Ethik identifizierte und zu einem Kardinalproblem der Philosophie erhob?
- Oder weist das Palais auf die zukünftige philosophische Haltung Wittgensteins voraus, entstand es doch in der entscheidenden Phase zwischen Früh- und Spätphilosophie?

Um diese Fragen einer Beantwortung näher zu bringen, sei zunächst der architektonische Bestand des Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein³ kurz dargelegt, um sodann die Frage nach der zugrunde liegenden Architekturtheorie zu stellen. In einem dritten Schritt kann anschließend die Relation zur gesamten Philosophie Wittgensteins erörtert werden. Für die gesamte Gestaltung zeichnet Wittgenstein selbst verantwortlich, der sich in den Jahren der Erbauung des Palais 1926 bis 1928 selbst "Architekt" nennt, wenn ihm auch sein Freund, der Architekt Engelmann, zur Seite stand.

Vier Quader unterschiedlicher Größe schieben sich zusammen, legen sich an einen mächtigen, zentralen Block, der über drei Geschoße aufragt und formen mit ihm das Konglomerat der rektangulär strukturierten Baumassen des Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein. Zwar suggeriert das streng rechtwinklige System der architektonischen Blöcke symmetrische Verhältnisse, doch werden die gegeneinander versetzten Kompartimente asymmetrisch angeordnet, so daß sich ein höchst spannungsgeladenes Gefüge aufbaut. Die Beschränkung auf stereometrische Formen ermöglicht im Zusammenwirken mit der glatten, völlig

³ Leitner, B. 1970 "Wittgenstein's Architecture", *Art Forum*, 59 ff.; ders., 1973 *Die Architektur von Ludwig Wittgenstein* Halifax/London; Nyíri, J.C., 1985 "Ludwig Wittgenstein - Philosophie der Kunst", *Mensch-Natur-Gesellschaft* 2, 52 ff.; Gebauer, G., Grünenwald, A. u.a. 1982 *Wien, Kundmannngasse 19. Philosophische und morphologische Aspekte des Wittgenstein-Hauses*, München; Bering, K., 1986 *Die Rolle der Kunst in der Philosophie Ludwig Wittgensteins (Kunst - Geschichte und Theorie, Bd. 6)* Essen

schmucklosen Fassade den Eindruck jener dissonanten Harmonie, den auch die Architektur des Inneren vermittelt, indem dunkle Farbtöne mit hellen Wänden und Decken kontrastieren. Den schmucklosen Fassaden entspricht die geradezu asketische Beschränkung bei der Dekoration, wie sie sich in der Verwendung von einfachen Glühbirnen anstelle von Lampen oder im Verzicht auf Teppiche oder Vorhänge äußert.

Damit unterscheidet sich Wittgensteins Palais fundamental von dem üblichen Bild Wiener Stadthäuser der 20er Jahre, die noch weitgehend von der Jugendstilarchitektur der Vorkriegsjahre geprägt waren, wie vor allem die Bauten Otto Wagners und Josef Maria Olbrichs mit einer Mischung von klassizistischen Elementen und Formen des Jugendstils zeigen. Zwei Beispiele: Um 1913 entwarf Josef Hoffmann das Landhaus Primavesi, in dem wuchernde vegetabile Ornamente Pilaster und Deckenbalken, Bett und Sessel gleichermaßen überziehen. Wenige Jahre zuvor baute Hoffmann das Palais Stoclet in Brüssel mit einem tonnengewölbten, eleganten Vestibül und einem Speisesaal, dessen Raumgefüge vor- und zurückweichende Pilaster bilden. An deren Stelle treten in Wittgensteins Architektur klar umrissene Wandkompartimente. Die Farbigkeit der Marmorverkleidungen verschwindet und gibt dem nüchternen Schwarz-Weiß-Kontrast Platz.

In Wien gibt es jedoch zumindest zwei Parallelen zu Wittgensteins Palais, die in der bisherigen Diskussion so gut wie keine Beachtung fanden: das Haus Steiner (St.-Veit-Gasse 10) aus dem Jahre 1910 und das Haus Scheu, begonnen zwei Jahre später.⁴ Beide Bauten entwarf Adolf Loos, der Lehrer des Architekten Paul Engelmann, mit dem Wittgenstein gemeinsam das Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein errichtete. Fünf Jahre nach dem Zusammenbruch der Donaumonarchie baute Loos in Paris für den Dadaisten Tristan Tzara 1926 im Jahr des Baubeginns am Palais in der Kundmangasse ein Wohnhaus, das die Tendenzen seiner Wiener Bauten der Vorkriegsjahre entschieden fortführte. Adolf Loos' Bauten markieren den Rahmen, in dem sich die zum Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein führenden Entwürfe Wittgensteins entfalteten.

Um die Entwicklung der Architektur des Palais beurteilen und in das Denken Wittgensteins einordnen zu können, erscheint es unbedingt notwendig zu sein, das architekturtheoretische Konzept der Bauten Loos' zu beachten. Die Häuser Steiner und Scheu verzichteten ebenso wie das Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein auf jegliches Ornament und stehen damit in völligem Gegensatz zu den üblichen zeitgenössischen Bauprojekten der ehemaligen Habsburger Metropole.

⁴ Borsi, F., Godoli, E. 1985 *Wiener Bauten der Jahrhundertwende*, Stuttgart

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Das Haus Steiner zeigt mit seinen risalitartigen Vorbauten eine klare, übersichtliche Gliederung, während Loos bei der Konzeption des Hauses Scheu eine dynamische Stufung der Bauelemente bevorzugte. In diesen Entwürfen artikuliert sich Loos' Polemik gegen den Jugendstil sowie die ihn vertretenden führenden Architekten Wiens - vor allem Olbrich und Hoffmann - und damit zugleich seine Opposition gegen das bürgerliche System des Habsburger Reiches.⁵

In der Hinwendung zu dekorloser Funktionalität zeigt sich eine wesentliche Wurzel der Architekturtheorie Adolf Loos': der amerikanische Funktionalismus, den der Österreicher in den Jahren 1893 bis 1896 in der Hochburg der funktionalistischen Architektur, in Chicago, aus unmittelbarem Erleben kennenlernte. Die Neubauten Chicagos standen im Zeichen des Funktionalismus, geprägt durch Louis H. Sullivan, der am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts zu einem der führenden Architekturtheoretiker avancierte. Seine Lehre kulminierte in dem epochalen, 1896 geäußerten Satz: "Es ist das Gesetz aller organischen und anorganischen, aller physischen und metaphysischen, aller menschlichen und übermenschlichen Dinge, aller echten Manifestationen des Kopfes, des Herzens und der Seele, daß das Leben in seinem Ausdruck erkennbar ist, daß die Form immer der Funktion folgt."⁶ An diesen fundamentalen Gedanken, demzufolge auch die Kunst kein Abbild metaphysischer Erscheinungen ist, wird Adolf Loos anknüpfen, wenn er feststellt: "Die Bedeutung ist der Gebrauch."⁷

Wittgenstein lernte Adolf Loos im Sommer 1914 kennen und entwickelte bereits ein knappes Jahr später den Gedanken, die Theorie des Abbildes durch die Theorie des Funktionierens eines "Namens" im syntaktischen Gefüge zu ergänzen, wie die Tagebucheintragung vom 30.5.1915 belegt:

"Die Worte sind wie Haut auf einem tiefen Wasser. Es ist klar, daß es auf dasselbe hinauskommt zu fragen, was ist ein Satz, wie zu fragen, was ist eine Tatsache - oder ein Komplex ... Der Name eines Komplexes fungiert im Satz wie der Name eines Gegenstandes, welchen ich nur durch eine Beschreibung kenne. - Als Beschreibung fungiert der ihn abbildende Satz ... Namen kennzeichnen die Gemeinsamkeit einer Form und eines Inhalts. - Sie kennzeichnen erst mit ihrer syntaktischen Verwendung zusammen eine bestimmte logische Form."⁸

⁵ Janik, A., Toulmin, S. 1973 *Wittgenstein's Vienna* London, 92 ff.

⁶ Zit. n. Müller, U., Vogel, G. 1981 *Atlas zur Baukunst, Bd. 2* München, 521

⁷ Zit. n. Janik, A., Toulmin, S. 1973 *Wittgensteins Vienna* London, 207

⁸ TB 30.5.15; vgl. TLP 3.327

Im folgenden Jahr vermerkt Wittgenstein am 11. 9.: "*Die Art und Weise, wie die Sprache bezeichnet, spiegelt sich in ihrem Gebrauche wider.*"⁹ Damit äußert Wittgenstein sehr früh grundlegende Gedanken, die im "Tractatus" nur anklängen, jedoch in der Spätphilosophie das Fundament seines Denkens bilden.

Insgesamt zeichnet sich bei Loos und Sullivan ein architekturtheoretischer Horizont ab, der die Folie für die entscheidende Weiterentwicklung des Denkens Ludwig Wittgensteins abgibt, als dieser durch den Bau des Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein in unmittelbarem Kontakt mit den der Architektur zugrunde liegenden Vorstellungen kommt. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den Idealen der Klassik, mit Funktionalismus und Rationalismus kommt es zu Beginn der 20er Jahre zu neuen Ansätzen der Architekturtheorie, die jetzt soziale und ethische ebenso wie ästhetische Aspekte einbezieht und zu einer Synthese zu verschmelzen sucht. Einer der Wortführer dieser neuen Sicht der Architektur, Adolf Behne, formuliert bereits 1923:

"Indem die Teile des Baues sich nach ihrem Gebrauchssinn ordnen, indem aus dem ästhetischen Raum ein Lebensraum wird...wirft der Bau die Fesseln der alten, starr gewordenen statischen Ordnung, Achsen, Symmetrien usw., ab... Und sodann kommt durch die Anpassung an die Funktion der Bau zu einer weit größeren und besseren inneren Einheit ... Kein Wunder also, daß die Architekten versuchten, die letzten Möglichkeiten eines Funktionalismus zu erproben. Bauen hat diesen zur Voraussetzung ... Hierbei müssen alle Symmetrieachsen, alle Reißbrettgeometrien, alle Grundrißornamente sofort verschwinden: Architektur wird gestaltete Wirklichkeit ... Ist jeder Bau Teil eines gebauten Ganzen, so erkennt er bestimmte, allgemeingültige Regeln an - Regeln, die nicht aus seinem individuellen Zweckcharakter folgen, sondern aus den Ansprüchen dieses Ganzen - aus ästhetischen, formalen Ansprüchen. Denn hier, in der sozialen Sphäre, dürften überhaupt die Urelemente des Ästhetischen liegen ... Dort, wo der Bau als Teil eines Ganzen empfunden wird, tritt zu dem Werkzeugcharakter der Spielzeugcharakter, zum relativen Element das absolute."¹⁰

Die sich hier artikulierende Weltansicht erscheint als unmittelbare Folie für das Verständnis der Relevanz des Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein im Zuge der

⁹ TB 11.9.16

¹⁰ Behne, A. 1923 *Der moderne Zweckbau*, in: *Bauwelt Fundamente*, Bd. 1 Frankfurt-Berlin 1964

"Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins" Wittgenstein als Architekt

Entfaltung der Philosophie Ludwig Wittgensteins in jener Krisis seines Denkens: Im Spannungsfeld zwischen real gebauter Architektur und Architekturtheorie erlebt Wittgenstein jene für seine Philosophie fundamentale Erfahrung, daß ein Bauteil für sich keine Bedeutung hat, daß vielmehr erst die Funktion in einem architektonischen Verbund und darüber hinaus die Funktion der Architektur in einer Lebensform dem einzelnen Element die ihm zukommende Bedeutung verleiht: das Bauen eröffnet Wittgenstein das Konzept, das seine folgenden philosophischen Wege prägen wird.

Bedenkt man den architekturtheoretischen Hintergrund für Wittgensteins Palais in Wien, so ließe sich von einer Fortsetzung des Philosophierens in der Sprache der Architektur reden. Das Ziel des Nachdenkens, wie es sich im "Tractatus" niederschlägt, bestand darin, die Philosophie zu Ende zu bringen. Allerdings muß diese Vorstellung so verstanden werden, daß Wittgenstein gegen die metaphysische Spekulation anging und versuchte, die Grenze zwischen Sagbarem und Unsagbarem zu ziehen. Dabei geht Wittgenstein von einer a priori in der Welt bestehenden Ordnung aus. Wenn über die Welt nachgedacht und darüber gesprochen wird, so muß es etwas Gemeinsames zwischen Sprache und Welt geben. Es ließe sich also die Struktur der Welt darstellen, wenn die Struktur der Sprache bzw. des Denkens bekannt ist. Die Sätze der Sprache sind daher für Wittgenstein Bilder von Sachverhalten: "Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken." Wenn Wittgenstein also eine entschiedene Grenze zwischen Sagbarem und Unsagbarem zieht, so muß das Sprechen konsequenterweise an einem entscheidenden Punkt aufhören: "Das Buch (sc. der 'Tractatus') will dem Denken eine Grenze ziehen ... und was jenseits der Grenze liegt, wird einfach Unsinn sein."¹¹ Vor dieser Folie ist der letzte, vielleicht wichtigste Satz des "Tractatus" zu verstehen: "Worüber man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen." Aber dennoch gibt es für Wittgenstein "allerdings Unausprechliches. Dieses zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische"¹²

Die bisherigen Interpretationen der Architektur Wittgensteins gingen von diesem Schweigegebot des Philosophen aus, wie etwa Gunter Gebauer, der im Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein eine "Syntax des Schweigens" sieht und annimmt, Wittgenstein habe in der Architektur "das Symbolsystem gefunden, mit dem er, ohne in das Sprechen zurückzufallen, sein Schweigen ausdrücken kann." Die Elemente des Hauses seien in "eine Welt der Bewegungslosigkeit, Strenge und Ordnung eingeschlossen". So, wie der "Tractatus" Elementarsätze

¹¹ TLP (Vorwort)

¹² TLP 7

als letzte Einheiten der Sprache kenne, so sei die komplexe Struktur des Palais zerlegbar in einzelne, genau sichtbare Elemente.¹³

Der Versuch, das Palais Stonborough-Wittgenstein in den Rahmen der funktionalistischen Architektur zu integrieren, konnte demgegenüber belegen, daß es vielmehr auf die Funktion des einzelnen Elementes in einem umfassenden Ganzen ankommt. Die durch das Bauen gewonnenen Erfahrungen, die in diesem architekturtheoretischen Rahmen auf die Totalität des Lebens abzielen, konvergieren mit Mauthners Gedanken des "Sprachspiels" oder Sprangers Theorie der "Lebensform". Es ist nicht verwunderlich, daß Wittgenstein in den "Philosophischen Untersuchungen" immer wieder Vergleiche zur Architektur sucht - die Sprache vergleicht Wittgenstein sogar mit einer Ansammlung von Häusern. Viele der zahlreichen Sprachspiele nimmt er aus dem Bereich des Bauens und stellt die Frage nach dem Funktionieren der Sprache in Lebensformen, womit es ihm letztlich um die ethische Dimension des Lebens geht. Damit verfolgt Wittgenstein jene im "Tractatus" bereits festgeschriebene Vorstellung: "Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins." Wenn man mit K. Wuchterl und A. Hübner den "eigentliche(n) Schlüssel zum einheitlichen Verständnis der gesamten Wittgensteinischen Philosophie und seines Lebens ... in seinem Verhältnis zur Ethik"¹⁴ sieht, so kommt der ästhetischen Dimension aufgrund der Identifikation von Ethik und Ästhetik entscheidende Bedeutung für eine Beurteilung des Gesamtwerks zu.¹⁵ In den Bereich der Analyse von Sprachspielen bezieht Wittgenstein insbesondere auch die Begriffe der Ästhetik und Ethik ein, wenn er in den "Philosophischen Untersuchungen" den Leser auffordert zu fragen, auf welche Weise er die Bedeutung ethischer oder ästhetischer Begriffe gelernt habe, um diese Begriffe in ihrer Systemgebundenheit zu erkennen. Die Bedeutung eines Zeichens zeigt sich im Gebrauch: "Jedes Zeichen allein scheint tot. Was gibt ihm Leben? - Im Gebrauch lebt es."¹⁶ Die ethische wie die ästhetische Dimension zeigen sich in Sprachspielen.

Der Gebrauch, die Bedeutung des Zeichens, ergibt sich aus der Funktion in umfassenden Systemen - wie sagte doch Adolf Loos?: "Die Bedeutung ist der Gebrauch." Wittgenstein selbst zählt Loos zu den Persönlichkeiten, denen er am

¹³ Gebauer, G. u.a. (wie Anm. 3), 220 ff.; vgl. Gebauer, G., Wulf, C. 1994 "Soziale Mimesis", in: Wulf, C. u.a. (wie Anm. 2), 75 ff., bes. 83

¹⁴ Wuchterl, W., Hübner, A. 1979 *Wittgenstein* Reinbek, 78

¹⁵ TB 24.7.16: "Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins...Die Ethik handelt nicht von der Welt. Die Ethik muß eine Bedingung der Welt sein, wie die Logik. Ethik und Aesthetik sind Eins." Vgl. TLP 5.621; 6.421

¹⁶ U 432

"Ethik und Ästhetik sind Eins" Wittgenstein als Architekt

meisten zu verdanken habe.¹⁷ Hinzuzufügen bleibt noch Loos' Schüler Engelmann, der im November 1925 an Wittgenstein schreibt: "*Das Denken war mir eine Art Bauen...*"¹⁸ Jahre später wird Wittgenstein in seinen Vorlesungen über Ästhetik formulieren: "*Wenn wir Häuser bauen, sprechen und schreiben wir.*"

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¹⁷ Helme, M. 1981 "Ludwig Wittgenstein", in: Höffe, O. (ed.), *Klassiker der Philosophie*, Bd. 2 München, S. 345

¹⁸ LRKM 156

Olaf Brill

Legends or Facts? – A Folklorist's Approach to Film Historiography

1. Film Historiography and the Study of Tales

In this paper, I want to show how one scientific discipline, film historiography, can be linked to another: the study of tales. For the study of tales this is a new topic, and for film historiography this is a new method. To avoid misunderstandings: I do not propose to analyze tales *in* films (i.e. film plots), but tales *about* films, e.g. stories about the production history of one particular film. So far, film historiography regards these stories not as tales, but simply as historical facts, i.e. true empirical statements. On the one hand, this is not all that can be said about these stories, on the other hand, it's, as we will see, a doubtful claim.

Tales are studied in two disciplines: *folklore*, or more precisely the study of folk tales, which is mainly concerned with the spoken word, and *literature*, which is mainly concerned with the written word. These two disciplines have much in common: they both deal with texts, they both examine tales, there can even be interactions between oral and written tales: a written story can inspire oral story-telling, and an orally transmitted story can be written down (like in books of fairy-tales). Also, certain genres can be transmitted in written form as well as orally, e.g. the so-called urban legend (also known as contemporary legend, or nasty legend: tales about phantom hitchhikers, UFOs, pets in the microwave, ice-blocks falling down from the sky with the frozen faeces from airplane toilets etc.) which is also transmitted as newspaper legend. Research about the newspaper legend certainly belongs more to folklore than to literature.

The legends in film historiography are transmitted mainly in writing, namely in the film literature, but they show two characteristics which we know especially from folk tales:

1. *Claim of truth*: urban legends, newspaper legends and legends in film historiography have all in common, that they claim that the story they are telling is literally true.
2. *Broad spreading*: once told, good tales are spreaded and told everywhere in very short time.

Let me illustrate this with one example from film historiography, namely a story about the production of the famous German film *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* from 1920. *Caligari* is an important film. It was the first example of the so-called Expressionist Film, with painted sets and a grotesque, distorted style. It was very influential, and it has played a central rôle in Siegfried Kracauer's important book *From Caligari to Hitler* (Kracauer 1947), in which Kracauer tries to explain the rise of Hitler through psychological dispositions of the German people in the time between 1918 and 1933, which can be shown in German films. The following story was first told by Hans Janowitz, one of *Caligari*'s authors, in his script *Caligari—The Story of a Famous Story* (Janowitz 1941), written 1940/41 in exile in New York. Kracauer, also an exile from Germany living in New York, included it in the *Caligari* chapter of his book, and from there it had been spread in film historiography and become very famous. It has been re-narrated in nearly every longer work about *Caligari* after 1947. And it has become part of film history.

2. The Story of Holstenwall

It is a horror story which Janowitz has supposedly experienced in October 1913 in Hamburg. Janowitz credits this story to be the main inspiration for the *Caligari* script. He claims that he has reported the story to his co-author Carl Mayer, when they were searching for an idea for a film script in November, December 1918.

Here is a short version of the story, according to Janowitz 1941: One Sunday evening in late October 1913, Janowitz strolled across an amusement park on the Reeperbahn in Hamburg, looking for a girl who had enchanted him with her beauty and happy manners. Janowitz describes the girl as "the girl with the slender figure, and the quick little walk, which made her rustling blue skirt swing from side to side" (p. 64) and "that beautiful, rather amiable creature, with the sparkling brown eyes and bubbling, spring-like laughter" (p. 65). He found her again in the darkness of the park adjoining the Holstenwall, but since she was together with a group of boys and girls, he only watched them secretly. Suddenly, he became aware of another shadow moving in the bushes who was also observing them. They noticed each other, and Janowitz saw, that the shadow was a bourgeois, a "good citizen" (p. 64) with an ulster and a round hat pulled down over his forehead. Meanwhile, Janowitz lost sight of the girl, so he went home. On his way home he met some late moviegoers leaving a cinema who had seen the French film *L'homme qui L'Assasina* (The man who mur-

dered). The following day, there appeared an extra edition of the newspapers: "Horrible Sex Crime on the Holstenwall! Young Gertrude—Murdered!"

Convinced that the girl he had seen was Gertrude, and that the bourgeois was her murderer, he decided to attend Gertrude's funeral, and there, in the crowd following the coffin—he again encountered the murderer. They recognized each other, "a duel of intent gazes took place" (p. 69), and finally the murderer vanished in the crowd. On the same day at a subway station, they encountered once again: During Janowitz' train was leaving the station, the murderer appeared on the station platform, smiling.

The Holstenwall story was very important for Janowitz. He regarded this experience not only as the main inspiration for their *Caligari* film script but also as a prophecy of the coming First World War. For him, it was of great symbolic importance that the murder took place near the huge Bismarck memorial in Hamburg: "In Bismarck's shadow murder will come to Europe!" (p. 67). He emphasizes that the story is actually true and that he has witnessed and experienced it himself. He confirms the authenticity of the story with many realistic details such as the date, detailed descriptions etc.

Janowitz' script is yet unpublished (even a recent publication of a large excerpt in Budd 1990 did not contain the chapter with the Holstenwall story). Kracauer told a much shorter version, and it was this version that has been spread and repeated in film historiography, which passed the story on as a film historical fact. No one, so far as I can see, has tried to investigate if the story has a true basis. Many authors added their own details. So Stan Brakhage tells us, that Janowitz witnessed Gertrud and her boy-friend making love in the shrubbery before he noticed the bourgeois (Brakhage 1977), and in Curt Riess' version, Gertrude is a prostitute (Riess 1956).

3. The Truth About Holstenwall

All these authors have cribbed from Kracauer, not Janowitz, because Janowitz' original was not available. They believed Kracauer's tale and made no try to find another source, although this is very simple: The story tells us that there were newspaper headlines—so these newspapers could be found. The story tells us that there was a murder—so there should be police reports. Let's first check if these things exist. Unfortunately, the police reports are lost (information from the Hamburger Staatsarchiv in a letter to the author from Dec. 14th, 1994), but the Hamburg newspapers from 3rd to 11th of November 1913 tell a story that is a little different from Janowitz':

According to the newspapers, the murder at the Holstenwall has happened in fact. The girl's name was Gertrud Ottilie Siefert, born September 19th 1905 in Hamburg, daughter of a postman, living in Peterstraße 34. She was murdered in the night from Sunday, November 2nd to Monday, November 3rd 1913 and her corpse has been found on Monday morning in the bushes of the Holstenwall park. That means, that Janowitz' date (late October) was nearly correct. That the story has always been told as happened in October 1913 shows that nobody has consulted the newspapers. The name Janowitz gave the girl in his story (Gertrud) was also correct, but Gertrud was not an adolescent (and also not a prostitute) but an eight year old schoolgirl.

The newspapers tell us that she has been abused, strangled and stabbed. There are indications that she was murdered at another place. Gertrud's sister witnessed a man attracting Gertrud with chocolate in front of their house in Peterstraße 34. The sister wanted to go with them but the man sent her away. She cried, and two boys promised to follow her sister and the man to make sure that everything was alright. Unfortunately, the boys lost sight of them in the Holstenwall park. That means, the man was already with Gertrud when they approached the Holstenwall park. So, according to this version, Janowitz could not have seen the girl with the rustling blue skirt together with other boys and girls in the Holstenwall park and the murderer observing her from the bushes. The story of the boys following the man is the motif of a person who watches murderer and victim, fails to interfere and who then must read in the next day's newspaper that the girl was murdered. This motif of course has also been used by Janowitz in his version of the story (where Janowitz himself is the man who fails to prevent the crime).

The sister, the boys and other witnesses gave a description of the suspect which resembles Janowitz' description of the bourgeois. The police urgently sought for more witnesses, offered a reward of 1000 Mark (the reward appears again in the *Caligari* film), and during the week 300 witnesses registered, several suspects were arrested, but no one proved to be the murderer. All through the week the newspapers reported news about the search for the murderer.

If we believe the newspapers, thousands of people attended Gertrud's funeral on Sunday, November 9th. Police was present. Then, a heckler disturbed the ceremony and was immediately arrested. After that, rumors arose, that the murderer had been arrested. So far as we know, the real murderer has never been caught. Due to another murder in Hamburg-Altona on Saturday and the stagnating investigations of the police, the newspapers lost interest in the Holstenwall murder.

But let's return to the funeral: Since the bourgeois was described in the newspapers very accurately, it is very unlikely that he attended the funeral, like Janowitz states. And if Janowitz had really encountered him there, why shouldn't he have called the police? In other words: Janowitz used many details from the Holstenwall story in the newspapers, but the story told in the newspapers differs distinctly from the story told by Janowitz. It does not seem likely that Janowitz in fact encountered the murderer in the Holstenwall park, and it does not seem likely that he encountered him again at Gertrud's funeral.

I tell you what happened in fact. Janowitz was a young poet living in Hamburg. He read the story of the Holstenwall murder in the newspaper and that stirred his imagination. Janowitz was fascinated about the motif of the murdered girl. He had used it in his short-story *Das zierliche Mädchen* (The dainty girl) which appeared in 1913, eight months before the Holstenwall murder (Janowitz 1913). In this short-story, we find some of the elements Janowitz used again in his Holstenwall story: the adolescent girl, getting involved with men too early and gets punished, the amusement park, the descent from the working-class, the sex crime. The newspaper reports about the murder at the Holstenwall must have inspired Janowitz to compose a new story: there in the newspapers he found the motif of the bourgeois, of the man who observed everything but failed to interfere, and of the murderer being present at the funeral ceremony. Even the film *L'homme qui L'Assasina* was probably not shown in Hamburg in 1913, but the title of course fits the story. Possibly, Janowitz took the title from the 1930 sound film *Der Mann, der den Mord beging* (The man who murdered) which has been adapted from the French stage play by his colleague Carl Mayer.

From these components, Janowitz fabricated a story and told it as experienced by himself. Then, this story has been spread by film historiography and believed to be true, without ever being checked. That's the genesis of a legend!

4. Conclusions

The above analysis shows that the story of Holstenwall

- is a good tale: it is exciting, interesting, well told and has a dramatic climax.
- is not literally true: Janowitz has constructed it from various sources, and claiming its truth is only part of his strategy of story telling.
- has nevertheless been spreaded and considered as a true fact in film historiography. It has never been seriously examined.

The conclusion is, of course, that we should look at the story of Holstenwall as a tale and not as a fact. This has hopefully an enlightening effect regarding other legends which were spreaded in film historiography, or legends in general: We should not believe everything we are told! The reason for telling stories is mainly that we like listening to good tales, not that these tales are true (although, of course, they *could* be true; but there is no reason to believe them *prima facie*).

In the 18th century, the Enlightenment fought against the superstitiousness of the people who believed in demons, hobgoblins, witches etc. Some advocates of Enlightenment even held the opinion that folk tales, which were regarded as the source of superstition, should vanish. This is not a tenable position any more. The Enlightenment has not wiped out fairy-tales, legends and myths, and on the contrary: folk tales are still being spread, orally, in newspapers, in history books, and especially through the new media like telephone, broadcasting, television, and computer usenet. But that does not mean that the Enlightenment failed. Its aim should not be to extinguish folk tales, but to restrict the credulity that leads to the quick acceptance of the truth of these stories. Janowitz' story is an exciting and interesting tale. Therefore, it possibly will always belong to the history of *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* and to film history. But it's not an acceptable position that it has happened in fact the way Janowitz told it. Film historiography should regard it not as a part of reality but as a part of story telling tradition.

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The King of Music & The King of Pop

The recent musical marriage between Beethoven and Michael Jackson was unexpected to pop fans as well as to art music lovers (on the CD "Dangerous", track 11). In this paper I will look into the value of this music, and from the perspective of musical aesthetics as well as that of the sociology of music, try to explain this match. In this connection I will also consider the musical writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Starting our story in late 18th century, we find that in the sphere of art music probably not more than 5% of the population in Vienna (or in Sweden) had ever heard music by composers such as Bach and Mozart. Philosophical and theoretical books on music were read by a much smaller proportion.

The music of the church and the courts at this time still had a representative and functional role. Music writers and theorists visualized instrumental music as an offspring of vocal music. It should fulfil its expected functions and conform to the style of the genre. Music was heard as a cantata, a concerto, a fugue etc. The mode of listening to music was positioned along the horizon of expectancy; every new piece was listened to as an example of its kind. The expressive qualities of music were determined by their stylistic affiliation.

All this slowly changed due to the socio-political situation in 18th century Europe. Among the professional and intellectual strata of the German bourgeoisie a culture developed that "showed all the signs of exerting a... leadership beyond the reach of the self-serving aristocracy" (Eagleton 1990 p.14). Sensitive to the changing cultural winds Baumgarten already in his *Aesthetica* (1750)¹ tried to reconcile reason with the idea that perception could be understood as a kind of knowledge in its own right. That the beautiful should be perceived by the mind through the senses, and that perception as such was an aesthetic act, can be seen as different sides of the same coin; these ideas made up the foundation in developing bourgeois models of explanation as to the role and function of art. As the binding forces of the bourgeois social order, custom, piety and sentiments functioned as a contrast to the antagonistic economic and political life (Eagleton *ibid*). Thus, during this period, daily life and cultural

¹ Cf *Meditationes philosophicae ...* (1735 § 116): "*Things known* then, are those known by the superior faculty ... *Things perceived* come within the ambit of the science of perception and are the object of the lower faculty. These may be termed *aesthetic*".

habits also changed: on the musical scene sonatas for both »Kenner» and »Liebhaber» were written, as well as collections of »Lieder in Volkston» etc.² Interest in instrumental music increased and concerts for a paying audience became more common, developing in the first half of the 19th century into a craze for virtuoso performances and later on into concerts with more balanced repertoires.

On the one hand, then, we find in bourgeois circles an interest in secular songs communicating sentiments and different emotional moods, resulting in a mode of listening that was to a great extent conditioned by lyrics and emotions. Also from the 19th-century, singing within bourgeois families was a highly appreciated and popular musical activity. On the other hand the increasing popularity of instrumental music changed the views of philosophers as to its status and meaning. This can be understood by the question `Sonata, what do you want from me?', as Rousseau reported. Kant of course, also had difficulties with instrumental music placing lowest among the arts, suspecting that it was "mehr Genuss als Kultur".

Nothing, however could stop the flood of instrumental music. The understanding of its value also changed among the philosophers as instrumental music was played and listened to among far larger groups than before. Its value was founded in socio-cultural acts of socialization. Although as Lippman notes, the beauty of music "was not lessened by pleasure in tonal sonority, but rather that both its beauty and significance were deepened by their sensuous element" (1992 p.133). In the 19th century it also became more common among the bourgeoisie to listen to long chamber music pieces as well as symphonies.

The desire to understand and also defend these socio-musical changes slowly brought about different attitudes to music. This was perhaps first evident in the so-called Beethoven-Rossini debate ("the German eagle"- "the butterfly from the South) from the 1820s. Those captivated by Rossini rejected the late music of Beethoven. Other antithetical pairs like lyrical-dramatic and lower-higher were used by philosophers and musical writers in their response to exterior socio-economical pressures and to delimit and defend their own type of music. At the same time they transferred the values of instrumental music from the worldly and particular to the spiritual and universal bringing meaning from music's outside into its inside. Moreover, instrumental music not only contained transcendent meaning, it also embodied it. This transcendental and formalist

² Klopstock, communicated the new, emotional mode of thinking in a way which, according to Herder was completely novel in German. Cf LCA I:13.

move led to the belief that music meant itself (Goehr 1992). In Hegel's words, music was an "abstract interiority of pure sounds" or in the influential Eduard Hanslick's phrase, the form and content of music together consist of "tonally moving forms".

No philosopher, however, solved the dilemma of how instrumental music could be, at the same time, both sensuous and spiritual. It was most often taken as a fact that music as an autonomous art presupposed an objective detached mode of listening. "True reception" came to be regarded as an intellectual/moral achievement; the "correct" aesthetic understanding of music served to separate the sheep from the goats. This belief however was held only by a few among the bourgeoisie. To the great majority, the hermeneutic movement that came on around 1900 was a confirmation of the mode in which the majority listened (cf below).

In Vienna, Schönberg, Wittgenstein and Loos among others reacted in similar ways to the ethical and aesthetic situation of the day (Einhorn, 1989). It is, of course, not difficult to find many parallels between Wittgenstein's TLP and Schönberg's music and writings: the soul of music - represented by musical thoughts - existed in the logic of the formal composition. Schönberg also searched for extreme precision in his music. It should be true to itself, all the more, since music said more than words.³ His music was listened to by fewer and fewer as it was composed according to his new method of composition: dodecaphonic technique. This form of art music could not uphold the old pretention of art music acting as an aesthetic force binding bourgeois society together. The abyss between avant-garde music and everyday music, i.e. *middle music* (cf below), has stayed open.

In the 20th century, then, we find among the bourgeoisie a strong belief in the value of art music. As was the case with Wagner, they believed that the peak of the symphonic tradition was reached with Beethoven's ninth symphony. The knowledge of Beethoven as "the King of Music" also in the first decades penetrated the minds of working-class people.

Certain pieces by Beethoven could also be played at outdoor concerts, in restaurants, in connection with silent movies, etc. From a structural point of view this music was similar to the songs learnt at school, the piano pieces played at home, the music listened to in restaurants, etc, i.e. tonal music characterized by singable melodies, uncomplicated harmonies, and short forms. As I have argued elsewhere (1991), this type of music, middle music, was the musi-

³ Cf TLP 4.1212 and of course, 7.

cal mothertongue.

In spite of its structural similarity to verbal language, music is not a full language. Music as a structural system, whether as the smallest Gestalt or a whole piece, simply does not have all the properties to make this possible.⁴ A number of peripheral factors: what the lyrics is about, what circumstances we have heard the music - all these aspects condition our emotional and cognitive reaction to the music. Moreover, the human capacity and drive to evaluate and interpret make us look for homologies between these structures of music and outer daily life. We find that music imitates/arouses/expresses outer or inner life (abstract/concrete objects and feelings).

Born into its culture, every baby is able to interpret the musical elements of language without being able to understand the phonemes of Swedish, etc, that will later on be crucial to its developing understanding of its language code.⁵

Thus, as we grew up singing/playing/listening to music we learnt music as a music-game.⁶ Just as the same word can have many meanings, the same musical Gestalt can have even more meanings, not to speak of a melody. In principle the behavioural semantics of music must be learnt in the same collective way as language, »the problem» being of course that the nature of music makes this process harder to describe and analyse.⁷ We have to accept that the meaning of Gestalt/melody/piece will be far less easily translatable than the meaning of a word/sentence/story (maybe even hardly translatable at all).

Thus, four factors are always needed in order to discuss the meaning/content/reception/function of music. These are: (a) the object = the structure of the music; (b) the performance = the music played by different musicians/ensembles; (c) the situation = the place/time at which the music was performed; and (d) the individual = a person's background and disposition.

Twentieth-century popular music, as well as the sociology of music from the 1920s, has seriously undermined the hegemonic concept of musical aesthetics. The impact of the sociology of music among other things meant that questions of value and functions of musics were foregrounded.

In the 1920s, there is no doubt whatsoever that there were still major class differences (also) in terms of musical socialization. Within the lower social

⁴ Cf Ph Lieberman 1975 *On the Origins of Language*, p. 50f. Cf Wittgenstein's seemingly contrary view in Z 161.

⁵ Cf Wittgenstein on intonation, gestures, etc, in language and music in BB, CV, LCA, PI, TLP and Z.

⁶ Cf PI §7, 10 and also part II:iv /»associations and Beethoven«/. As Harlett notes (1977 p. 533) Wittgenstein recognized this analogy only in his later writings.

⁷ For an exploration of the process in connection to music, cf Scruton (1987).

strata, people listened to middle music from their own perspectives. The attitudes to this music were formed and the music was embraced on other terms than those prevailing within the higher social strata, which meant that the music could not possibly have the same meaning. At the same time, the lower social strata were constantly exposed to middle-class opinions and values, which were difficult to ignore and which were internalized as their own.

Middle music increasingly functioned as a unifying social cement between different social groups, despite, or thanks to, the fact that middle music can have both disparate and similar functions for people from different backgrounds.

The development of the gramophone, radio and films changed the accessibility of music. Music invaded the daily lives of people. Social change in use, function and reception has also meant changes in the meaning and value of music. To the cultural theoreticians in Frankfurt, music, i.e. massproduced music, was reduced to becoming merely an everyday empty accessory. Music lost its aura.

Today more than ever, thanks to the massmedia and schooling more people than ever before can take part and learn to listen to music since the aesthetic project started. On the other hand, we can conclude that for the great majority, listening to music was/is a social act in which a wellknown syntactic and quasi-semantic flow of musical structure was/is encoded. The more musically educated a person is, the more her understanding of the musical structure can also rely on a bewildering class of musical experiences, as Scruton has called it, i.e. hearing "counterpoint as a unity of concurrent movement; hearing energy, languor, hesitation, and resolution..." (1987 p.174).

I don't want to imply however, that many people hear music the way the Viennese musicologist Schenker's graphs/theory suggested, i.e. reducing movements to an *Ursatz* (a melodic/harmonic skeleton). Quite the opposite; his musical world contained no extramusical implications. One person, forced to state her opinion of one melody, listening at one end of a continuum will offer the comment "nice", while a person at the opposite end will logically have to admit that she can't say anything since she believes the connotations/meaning, etc, of the music to be nothing **but** musical.

For Wittgenstein we are also told, the dictum of Schopenhauer, "Music is a world in itself" was still true.⁸ Music was an important undertaking among his

⁸ Drury p. 67f. Cf the remark in BB 178, in which Wittgenstein is "tempted to reply 'Music conveys to us itself'". Cf. Goldman's similar view on this subject (1992).

family, several of whom were accomplished musicians.⁹ He was a friend of Schönberg's, who he considered to be the ideal type of art musician. In his later life, as Janik & Toulmin (1973 p. 175) also tell us, Wittgenstein liked to discuss the expressive power of music. As I understand it, this aura of »unsayableness» and the higher truth of music was an insocialized belief for him and his friends in Vienna. We thus find in his earlier as well as in his later writings many allusions to music and composers. Even though a systematic investigation of the content and quantity of his comments on music, as far as I know has not been made, I believe there are few comments in the earlier formalistic/idealistic vein in PI as he there focused on language as behavior. On the other hand you will find many such comments in LCA, as in Z and CV. As I understand Wittgenstein, in PI he gradually gave up the idea that there existed a gulf between *facts*/language and transcendental *values*/poems - and thus also music. I would agree with PI 527 but find it hard to swallow e.g. Z 157-160. This does not mean that I make light of the understanding/meaning of music, only that I find it hard to accept suggestions of transcendental meanings/values as well as explanations referring to the relative independence of art (autonomy or semi-autonomy of art). I'll therefore stick to the model outlined above.

In conclusion, then, the great majority of westerners have been socialized in to the thought of "higher" and "lower" music, and it has taken most of this century before general socio-cultural changes have severely transformed or shaken this conceptual base. Popular songs and middle music have all the time provided the daily diet. This is why people in the West will have no problem listening to an excerpt from a Beethoven symphony, followed by a newly composed gospel by Michael Jackson. Schiller's question: "Ahnest Du den Schöpfer?" and Jackson's question "Will you be there?" are responded to by Jackson's message of trust and belief in a better world. The supreme God of Music and the King of Pop guarantee the value of this music. Who could ask for more...?

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Wittgenstein über den Ausdruck von Kunstwerken

Wir sprechen häufig vom ästhetischen Ausdruck, wenn wir z.B. von einem Musikstück oder einem Gemälde sagen, es habe z.B. einen traurigen, einen melancholischen oder wütenden Ausdruck. Nun kann man sich über den Ausdruck vieles fragen. Ist der Ausdruck eine Eigenschaft des Kunstwerks, das den Ausdruck hat? Wenn ja, wodurch kommt diese Eigenschaft zustande? Wird der Ausdruck durch Merkmale des Kunstwerks bestimmt? Wie ist dann das Verhältnis der Merkmale des ausdrucksvollen Gegenstands zu dessen Ausdruck zu denken? Es gibt aber noch viel grundlegendere Fragen: Wie kann überhaupt ein Gemälde oder ein Musikstück etwas ausdrücken? Es ist oft bemerkt worden, daß es schwierig scheint zu erklären, wie denn unbeseelten Gegenständen Prädikate wie "hat einen traurigen Ausdruck" zugeschrieben werden können, wenn man annimmt, daß diese Prädikate vorwiegend oder primär auf beseelte Lebewesen Anwendung finden. Deswegen könnte man sich fragen, ob der Ausdruck vielleicht gar nichts mit den Merkmalen des jeweiligen Gegenstands zu tun hat, sondern stattdessen nur in diesen hineinprojiziert wird und von den Gefühlen, Assoziationen oder Einstellungen der Menschen abhängt, die ihn wahrnehmen? Oder auch von den Gefühlen der Künstler, wenn sie ein Kunstwerk mit einem bestimmten Ausdruck produzieren? Oder soll man eine Theorie des "reinen Ausdrucks" formulieren und die These vertreten, der Ausdruck werde nicht einmal in den Gegenstand hineinprojiziert, sondern habe gar nichts mit diesem zu tun? Davon, wie man diese Fragen beantwortet, hängen verschiedene Theorien des Ausdrucks ab. Der späte Wittgenstein hat vier solcher Theorien und mögliche Varianten von ihnen, die Gründe, die für sie sprechen, ihre Konsequenzen und die Probleme, die aus ihnen folgen, in vielen seiner Schriften ausführlich untersucht. Wenn man diese Überlegungen Wittgensteins zum ästhetischen Ausdruck zusammenstellt, ohne dabei ihren jeweiligen Textzusammenhang zu vernachlässigen, ergibt sich ein in erstaunlichem Umfang systematisch zusammenhängendes Bild, das ich im Hauptteil meines Vortrags skizzieren möchte. Schließlich werde ich die Wittgensteinsche Unterscheidung zwischen dem transitiven und dem intransitiven Gebrauch des Wortes "bestimmt" auf den Fall des Ausdrucks übertragen, um die Systematik des Ausdrucksbegriffs weiter

zu klären.¹

Der späte Wittgenstein beschäftigt sich in seinen Schriften mit vier Theorien des ästhetischen Ausdrucks; ich nenne sie (erstens) die Theorie der Merkmale, (zweitens) die Projektionstheorien des Ausdrucks, (drittens) die Theorie des reinen Ausdrucks und (viertens) phänomenalistische Theorien der Ausdruckswahrnehmung. In den meisten hier einschlägigen Passagen seiner Schriften behandelt er mehr als eine der Theorien auf einmal; es lassen sich zum Teil jedoch Schwerpunkte angeben, an denen es zentral um jeweils einen von ihnen geht.

Die *Theorie der Merkmale* erklärt den Sachverhalt, daß gerade dieses Kunstwerk gerade diesen Ausdruck hat, indem sie auf ein oder mehrere Merkmale² des Kunstwerks hinweist und es als konstitutiv für den jeweiligen Ausdruck auffaßt. Dazu muß man die für den Ausdruck wichtigen Merkmale von anderen, für den Ausdruck unwichtigen Merkmalen unterscheiden können. Die für den Ausdruck wichtigen Merkmale sind in einer solchen Auffassung die "charakteristischen" Merkmale. Wittgenstein hat die Theorie der Merkmale, angewandt auf ein Gemälde, in den Satz zusammengefaßt:

"What matters is the patches of colour." (LCA 34)

Damit ist gemeint, alles, was an dem Gemälde wichtig ist, und dazu gehört auch sein Ausdruck, sei durch die Verteilung der Farbe auf dem Untergrund festgelegt, d.h. durch die Merkmale des Gemäldes. Man könnte meinen, das sei doch in trivialer Weise richtig, denn schließlich besteht ein Gemälde aus einer bestimmten Verteilung von Farbfeldern. Aber selbst die ganz allgemeine Formulierung, der Ausdruck eines Gemäldes sei durch dessen Farbverteilung festgelegt, ist nicht einfach trivial wahr. Denn die so formulierte Auffassung sieht von der Umgebung des Gemäldes und typischen Reaktionen auf es vollkommen ab. Wittgenstein zeigt denn auch in seiner Schrift "Eine Philosophische Betrachtung"³, der deutschen Umarbeitung großer Teile des "Brown Book", daß man zwar in vielen Fällen Merkmale angeben kann, die notwendige Bedingungen für einen bestimmten Ausdruck sind, daß aber in all diesen Fällen

¹ Das ist nicht neu: Sowohl Scruton 1983 als auch Johannessen 1990 deuten ein ähnliches Programm an; in Einzelheiten geben sie jedoch unzutreffende Interpretationen. Sowohl dieses Thema als auch die Einführung in Wittgensteins Untersuchung möglicher Ausdruckstheorien kann hier nur überblicksweise vorgestellt werden. Für die exegetisch abgesicherte Interpretation vgl. Hobuß 1995 und 1996.

² "Merkmal" wird hier in der Bedeutung "materielles Merkmal" oder "Element" gebraucht, ohne daß ich mich damit auf eine bestimmte Theorie festlegen will, was Merkmale oder auch Eigenschaften sind.

³ Im folgenden abgekürzt: EPhilB.

das Vorliegen dieser Merkmale nicht auch hinreichend sein muß.⁴ Und deshalb ist die Formulierung, ein Merkmal M lege einen Ausdruck A in der Weise fest, daß jeder Gegenstand mit M den Ausdruck A habe, nicht allgemeingültig. Gleichzeitig bestätigt sich im Laufe der wittgensteinschen Untersuchung jedoch, daß es die Merkmale des Kunstwerks sind, die seinen Ausdruck hervorbringen. Also kann immer nur für den Einzelfall festgestellt werden, daß ein Ausdruck mit M so, ohne M hingegen nicht so ist. Was bedeutet es aber dann, von "charakteristischen" Merkmalen zu sprechen? Für Wittgenstein sind Charakteristika nicht schon deswegen keine Charakteristika mehr, weil sie nicht universalgültig sind, was er in "Eine Philosophische Betrachtung" zunächst für den Fall seelischer Erlebnisse untersucht, um das Ergebnis dann auf den Ausdruck zu übertragen:

"Das Erlebnis des Tons, der Miene etc kannst Du doch nicht 'für das Überzeugtsein charakteristisch' nennen, da sie eben von andern Erlebnissen Lügen gestraft werden können.' - Aber in diesem und jenem Fall werden sie eben hier von etwa andren Lügen gestraft, und hier sind sie das hervorstechende Merkmal der Überzeugung. - Wie in diesem Gesicht der freundliche Mund der hervortretend freundliche Zug." (EPhilB S.222)

Und gleiches gilt nach Wittgenstein für den ästhetischen Ausdruck: Charakteristische Merkmale sind einfach deswegen charakteristisch, weil sie im jeweiligen Einzelfall den Ausdruck des Kunstwerks festlegen.

Die *Projektionstheorien des Ausdrucks* besagen, es komme gerade nicht "auf die Farbflecken" an, sondern, gewissermaßen im Gegenteil:

It is all the attitude. (LCA 35)

Obwohl die Ausdruckstheorien, die dieser Auffassung entsprechen, im Alltag und in der philosophischen Literatur die am häufigsten vertretenen sind, sind es die uninteressantesten, da sie, wie wir gleich sehen werden, die wichtigen Probleme einfach beiseitelassen, anstatt sich mit ihnen zu beschäftigen. Hier wird der Ausdruck nicht durch die Angabe von Merkmalen, sondern dadurch festgelegt, welche Einstellung der Künstler oder der Betrachter des ausdrucksvollen Kunstwerks hat - oder welche Eindrücke, Assoziationen oder Gefühle es erzeugt. Dabei könnte man entweder die Auffassung vertreten, man müsse als Wahrnehmender einen Akt des Empfindens, Deutens, usw. vollbrin-

⁴ Wittgenstein zeigt dies für sein Beispiel des freundlichen Gesichtsausdrucks, was sich aber direkt auf den ästhetischen Ausdruck übertragen läßt.

gen, oder man kann den Ausdruck ganz an die vom Kunstwerk hervorgerufene Wirkung binden, ohne die bei der Rezeption vorhandene Einstellung in Betracht zu ziehen. Vor allem mit dieser Variante beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein und weist sie zurück. Es handelt sich hier um ein ganzes Bündel verwandter Theorien, die aber verwandt genug sind, um von Wittgenstein gemeinsam getroffen zu werden. Ich fasse alle Varianten unter dem Titel "Projektionstheorien des Ausdrucks" zusammen, weil sie in der Behauptung übereinstimmen, daß der Ausdruck ins Kunstwerk hineinprojiziert wird: Er wird nicht durch Merkmale festgelegt, sondern durch dem Kunstwerk äußerliche seelische Zustände, und ihm erst dann zugeschrieben.⁵ Wittgenstein führt in den LCA gegen diese Theorien an, daß wir Kunstwerke nicht wegen ihrer Assoziationen oder der Wirkungen, die sie haben mögen, rezipieren. Wir könnten es natürlich tun, und solche Fälle sind auch vorstellbar, aber es sind Ausnahme-, und nicht Regelfälle. Außerdem widerlegt Wittgenstein die Verknüpfung von Ausdruck und Wirkung mit dem folgenden zentralen Argument:

The expression is not an effect of the face - on me or anyone. You could not say that if anything else had this effect, it would have the expression of this face. (LCA 30)

Wenn der Ausdruck mit der Wirkung zu identifizieren wäre, müßte auch der Umkehrschluß möglich sein, daß zwei Gegenstände mit der gleichen Wirkung auch den gleichen Ausdruck hätten. Das anzunehmen wäre aber absurd. Wenn man also die Eindrücke, Assoziationen oder Gefühle, die ein Kunstwerk bewirken kann, als für seinen Ausdruck entscheidend auffaßt, wird der ausdrucksvolle Gegenstand beliebig, da er nur zum Zweck, etwas zu erzeugen, gebraucht wird.

Die *Theorie des reinen Ausdrucks* resultiert aus einer bestimmten Weise der Ablehnung der Merkmalstheorie: Zuerst sagt man sich, wenn der Ausdruck nicht mit Hilfe einer allgemeinen Regel von den Merkmalen des Kunstwerks abgeleitet werden kann, könne der Ausdruck eben gar nicht durch die Merkmale festgelegt werden. Dann, so meint man, sei auch der materielle Gegenstand, der den Ausdruck hat, ohne Bedeutung, und kommt so zur Vorstellung von einem Ausdruck, der zwar an Gegenständen wahrgenommen wird, aber nicht durch ihre Merkmale determiniert ist. Wittgenstein hat diese Auffassung im BrB (hier wieder für den Gesichtsausdruck) und in LCA untersucht. Im BrB diagnostiziert

⁵ Vgl. z.B. Allen 1990, 57: "The emotion thought to be in the music is in fact aroused in the listener and projected on to it".

er als Ursache dieser Auffassung die Redeweise "etwas *hat* einen Ausdruck".⁶ Weil man z.B. den in dem Satz "Diese Birne hat einen Stiel" bezeichneten Stiel von der Birne abtrennen kann (im Gegensatz zum Gelbsein der Birne im Satz "Diese Birne ist gelb"), meint man entsprechend, der Ausdruck sei derart vom Gesicht mit seinen Materialeigenschaften zu trennen wie der Stiel von der Birne. Wittgenstein untersucht die Auffassung ausführlich; ihre Zurückweisung gipfelt in dem Argument:

A man may sing a song with expression and without expression.
Then why not leave out the song - could you have the expression
then? (LCA 29)⁷

Die *phänomenalistischen Theorien der Ausdruckswahrnehmung* (Wittgenstein untersucht sie vor allem in BPP I und II, LS I und PU II) besagen, das Erkennen des Ausdrucks sei vom Wahrnehmen der Materialeigenschaften des Kunstwerks wesentlich verschieden. Und zwar sei man gar nicht berechtigt, vom *Wahrnehmen* des Ausdrucks etwa einer klagenden Melodie zu sprechen:

Die Wahrheit ist doch die: 'Klagen' ist ein Begriff, der nicht rein
akustisch ist. [...] (LS I 748)

Wittgenstein zeigt dagegen (vor allem für das Sehen, aber die Argumentation ist auf das Hören übertragbar): Je nachdem, ob man vom Sehen des Ausdrucks oder vom Sehen der Merkmale spricht, liegen zwar unterschiedliche Begriffe des Wahrgenommenen vor. Das bedeutet aber nicht, daß Wittgenstein der Auffassung zustimmt, man könne den Ausdruck nicht im selben Sinne sehen wie z.B. die Farben. Den phänomenalistischen Vorschlag, die Verwendung von "sehen" auf Fälle der Wahrnehmung von Formen und Farben einzuschränken, weist er mit dem Hinweis auf den tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauch zurück: Es wird eben in beiden Fällen von "sehen" gesprochen. Und es sei falsch, zwischen einer reinen, voraussetzungslosen Wahrnehmung der Merkmale auf der einen Seite und einem Merken, Empfinden oder Hinzudeuten des Ausdrucks auf der anderen Seite zu unterscheiden. Man könnte wegen des durchaus bestehenden Unterschieds eine sprachliche Differenzierung einführen, die aber der tatsächliche Sprachgebrauch, dem die Frage nach dem Sehen des Ausdrucks entstammt, nicht macht.

Es ist kennzeichnend für Wittgensteins Denken, daß es bei ihm keine universalgültige Theorie des ästhetischen Ausdrucks gibt: Wittgenstein löst den Streit

⁶ Vgl. BrB 162.

⁷ Die Theorie und ihre Zurückweisung sind nicht so trivial, wie es scheinen mag; vgl. dazu Hobuß 1996.

um konkurrierende Theorien nicht durch das Vorlegen einer neuen Theorie, sondern durch eine Betrachtung der Einzelfälle auf. Das heißt aber erstens nicht, daß nicht die einzelnen Theorien für gewisse Aspekte eine Teilrichtigkeit beanspruchen dürften, und es bedeutet zweitens insbesondere nicht, daß es nicht auch für Wittgenstein so etwas wie paradigmatische Fälle gäbe. Dies gilt etwa für die Rede von charakteristischen Merkmalen, wie ich sie oben dargestellt habe.

Außerdem kann man Wittgensteins Unterscheidung zwischen dem transitiven und dem intransitiven Gebrauch des Wortes "bestimmt", wie er sie im BrB 158-161 ausgearbeitet hat, auf den Ausdruck übertragen.⁸ Auch hier gibt es paradigmatische Fälle. Im BrB schreibt Wittgenstein, das Wort "bestimmt" ("peculiar") habe einen doppelten Gebrauch, der für eine Art Täuschung verantwortlich sei, der man hier leicht unterliege. Die beiden Gebrauchsweisen sind gemäß Wittgensteins Analyse die folgenden:

(1) Der *transitive* Gebrauch. Hier wird das Wort "bestimmt" gebraucht, um im Anschluß an das Wort zu einer Erläuterung überzugehen. Das Wort nimmt vorweg, daß eine Beschreibung, eine Spezifizierung, ein Vergleich folgen soll.

(2) Der *intransitive* Gebrauch. Hier wird das Wort "bestimmt" im Sinne einer Hervorhebung verwendet. Wittgenstein gibt ein Beispiel: Der Satz "This face gives me a particular impression which I can't describe" könnte bedeuten: "This face gives me a strong impression." Hier wird eine Beschreibung nicht vorbereitet, sondern geradezu verweigert.

Wenn man sich nun darüber täuscht, daß ein intransitiver Gebrauch vorliegt, könnte es so scheinen, als fehlte nur noch ein winziger Schritt zur Beschreibung dessen, wofür das "bestimmt" steht, obwohl es den Ort der scheinbar postulierten Beschreibung gar nicht gibt. Z.B. könnte man sagen "Diese Melodie drückt etwas ganz Bestimmtes aus" und sich nun fragen, was sie denn ausdrücke. Man würde aber keine Antwort geben, sondern etwa nur sagen "Nun - dies!". Und dann könnte man meinen, in der Formulierung werde die als "bestimmt" gekennzeichnete Sache mit etwas verglichen - mit sich selbst. Diese Idee nennt Wittgenstein die Idee, es gäbe einen *reflexiven* Vergleich. Sie entsteht dadurch, daß man den Fall des intransitiven Gebrauchs von "bestimmt" nimmt und nach dem Muster des transitiven konstruiert - nur mit dem Unterschied, daß man zum "Vergleich" nichts anderes hat als den Gegenstand selbst noch einmal.

Die Übertragung dieser Überlegungen auf den Ausdruck hat Wittgenstein selbst in BrB 162-167 angedeutet, allerdings nicht explizit gemacht. Sie ergibt

⁸ Vgl. ausführlich sowie für Literaturangaben Hobuß 1996.

folgende Typen von Redeweisen über den Ausdruck:

Wenn man sagt, ein Gemälde drücke Traurigkeit aus, ist das eine transitive Redeweise. Wenn man sagt, ein Musikstück sei sehr ausdrucksvoll, kann eine intransitive Redeweise vorliegen, nämlich dann, wenn man nicht weiter angeben will, was sie denn ausdrückt, oder nicht die Absicht hat, einen Vergleich oder eine genauere Charakterisierung folgen zu lassen. Der intransitive Gebrauch von Äußerungen wie "ein ganz bestimmter Ausdruck" und auch "diese Melodie drückt etwas aus/ sagt etwas" ist nach Wittgenstein eine normale Redeweise und völlig in Ordnung; er darf nur nicht mißverstanden und wie der transitive behandelt werden. Man muß sich nach Wittgenstein in solchen Fällen damit zufriedengeben, sagen zu können, eine Melodie habe einen starken Ausdruck, ohne angeben zu können, was sie ausdrückt. Die Frage, was denn ausgedrückt werde, ist den intransitiven Fällen unangemessen: Besser wäre es sogar, dann auf die Frage nach dem Was des Ausdrucks zu verzichten.

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How to Escape Aesthetic Dadaism

Contemporary art is inclined to reject any kind of limitation. Discussing the nature of art you will frequently encounter the opinion that any object can be regarded as an artefact. I am far from criticizing this attitude, and when I call it "aesthetic dadaism", there is no derogatory connotation. A certain degree of anarchy and disorder is always charming and contributes to the enrichment of life. The artistic anarchy, however, has the fatal side-effect that it renders difficult or even prevents any consistent reasoning on art. If anything can be considered art, the concept of art itself will become meaningless and dissolve. As a result the systematic investigation of aesthetic topics would turn to be a futile endeavour. In this case it would no longer make sense to discuss aesthetics and to organize international congresses devoted to this philosophical discipline.

Aesthetic approaches which are based on an undetermined concept of art tend to get entangled in sham problems. An example of this is provided by a passage from Arthur Danto's most recent treatise "The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art"¹ In this Danto suggests the following situation: imagine you see three identical snow shovels, one of which is undoubtedly a work of art. How can we explain, Danto asks, that one shovel is an artefact, though it does not differ in any detail from its counterparts, which are mere tools? This question is characteristic of Danto's approach to aesthetics. Usually he starts his discussions by visiting some museum hall and asking why all the objects he finds around him are works of art. However, the fact that somebody exhibits his construction as art does not entail that it indeed has the quality he attributes to it.

Analyzing the habits of the art business one will note that the acceptance of a work does not depend on aesthetic qualities alone. Sometimes a mixture of good relations and skillfully launched propaganda have a decisive impact on the further development of an artefact. Where the necessary conditions are given, artists, gallery owners, and critics constitute well functioning trusts, the only aim of which is the promotion of the mutual profit. Once an object has been exhibited in a reputable gallery and sold at high prices most intellectuals will not

¹ Danto, Arthur 1993 "Die philosophische Entmündigung der Kunst", München: Fink publ., p. 48

hesitate to recognize it as art. Nonetheless, these procedures do not affect average citizens, who normally persist in their naive unsophisticated taste. When an exhibition of modern art was opened in Salzburg a few years ago, the visitors came to judgements like these: "If I were drunk, I would like it." "Next night I shall dream of these awful pictures." "If my wife brings home such a trash, I shall kill her." "That's the decline of Western culture." "A vomitive."

No doubt, modern art has always had difficulties in achieving public recognition. In some cases its lack of persuasive power has led to embarrassing phenomena, as the following example shows. After the death of the German artist Joseph Beuys in 1986 a cleaning company was directed to clean the master's studio thoroughly. Doing this the employees not only wiped off the dust but also threw away a great deal of litter found there. Among other things they removed a pail of grease which hung beneath the ceiling. Shortly afterwards Beuys' friend and disciple Johannes Stüttgen visited the studio. He was shocked at the result of the action and discovered that the cleaning women had removed the "grease corner", which in his opinion had a value of 50,000 German marks.² Stüttgen sued for damages, but the regional court of appeal (Oberlandesgericht) in Düsseldorf rejected his claim without going into the question of "whether or not the grease corner represents a work of art". Stüttgen then lodged an appeal against this decision, and in November 1988 was awarded damages of 40,000 marks for the lost five pounds of butter.³

Confusions like these are inevitable if you leave the concept of art undefined. At this point I would like to repeat what I have already mentioned at the outset: I have nothing against confusion, but if you expect a reasonable discussion and a systematic approach to aesthetics you will have to introduce a demarcation of art. For this you have several possibilities at your disposal. I myself have decided for a definition which proved its advantages historically, namely that art is the expression of the artist's personality. The work of art is the reflection of a consciously operating individual, or in a more specific sense: it is the direct materialization of the artist's mind. A few years ago I had the opportunity of discussing in detail the reasons, the consequences and the benefits of this approach.⁴ Unfortunately the outline I am presenting here does not leave any space to summarize my considerations, so that I have to confine myself to some essential points. In principle I hold the opinion that most failures in con-

² Kein Schadenersatz für die "Fettecke", *Allgemeine Zeitung* 17.12.1987

³ Teure Beuys-Fettecke, *ibid.* 24.11.1988

⁴ Jung, Joachim 1987 "Subjektive Ästhetik" (New Studies in Aesthetics Vol. 1) New York: Peter Lang, pp. 195 - 217

temporary aesthetics arise from the fact that the relevant investigations are mainly concerned with the reception of art. I believe that aesthetical research will get a few steps further if it focuses on the analysis of creativity, on the intentions of the productive personality.

One consequence of this definition is that certain objects have to be excluded from the realm of art. Natural phenomena cannot be considered to be art if one leaves aside horticulture, which is a borderline case. Elephants, apes, climbing plants or lime trees are no artefacts nor are they capable of creating them. A few months ago a Vienna gallery tried to give a counter-example by exhibiting the paintings of an orang-utan. This inhabitant of Vienna's municipal zoo had tremendous commercial success with her products since all of them were sold.⁵ Nonetheless, the exhibition was only a gag, which would lose its attraction if one repeated it permanently.

The same is true for a similar incident which occurred in the late fifties. At the time the Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev was visiting a Western country, where he was invited to inspect an exhibition of modern art. Khrushchev was not too amused about the colour constructions he saw, uttering his opinion frankly: "That looks as if a donkey had painted it with its tail." An artist heard of this remark and subsequently hired a donkey to assist him in his work. He dipped the animal's tail into a bucket of dye and held a canvas against its back side. Thus by wagging its tail the animal produced a painting. Nobody will dispute the author's inventiveness, but that does not alter the fact that a construction like this belongs to the category of "jokes" and "quips" rather than to the realm of art.

The second group of objects which should be excluded from art is industrial mass products. Soup tins, coat stands, bottle racks or snow shovels cannot count as artefacts unless a person has laid hand on them thus converting them into an expression of his personality. Plain unmodified tools should not pass as artefacts. Of course, you are not compelled to accept this demarcation but then you would have to face aesthetic dadaism with all consequences I have mentioned above. In this case anyone backed by a propaganda trust would be able to look around on rubbish tips and to sell his findings as artefacts.

The definition I have introduced leads us to the crucial question: How can we detect the artistic content of an object? By what means can we find out that an artist has indeed expressed his personality in a work? Or in other words: how can we prove that a work of art is genuine? I would like to exemplify the ques-

⁵ Tachismus und All-over-Painting, *Wiener Zeitung* 14.2.1995