



# Section 4

ETHICS AND CURRENT SCIENTIFIC  
RESEARCH

ETHIK UND WISSENSCHAFTLICHE  
FORSCHUNG



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## Resignation of Feelings and Will

Aiming to know my way about the enigmatic 'will' I wrote this paper taking as a point of departure the remarks Wittgenstein made in *TS213*<sup>1</sup> regarding its relation to philosophical activity, which I summarized as follows: The difficulty of philosophy is different from intellectual difficulties faced by scientists, because it demands a changing of point of view. When a philosopher tries to understand the significance of an object he must overcome resistances of will, that means, in order to change his perspective a resignation of feelings is demanded from him. What makes an object hardly understandable is the opposition between our wish to understand it and that comprehension most people want to see. Consequently, out of this conflict between our wish for a perspicuous view of the object and the vision imposed by a certain majority it would result that objects we have nearby could become the most difficult ones to understand. Further on Wittgenstein points out how the resistances of will could be overcome by a philosopher and the way I interpreted it the recommendations he makes implies some kind of self-analysis by means of which the philosopher would recognize how the will of a majority hinders his own perception of the object whose significance he wants to know<sup>2</sup>. But how to proceed in doing such self-analysis?

A hint for this proceeding is given by him in the next section of *TS213*, where discussing the possibility of philosophical errors he points out as a source for them our thinking oriented by certain analogies we do not recognize as such. This ignorance would make us to integrate false analogies in our language which in turn would be responsible for the missteps given by thought in the accomplishment of philosophical activity. The integration of false analogies into language, he asserts, "means a constant fight and restlessness"<sup>3</sup>. Very well, since we do not integrate false analogies in our language because of magical powers, where to search for their origins?

The first movement I made lead me to the recognizing of the false analogies I have acquired by living in a society which ascribes a *high value to scientific*

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<sup>1</sup> I am quoting from an integral reproduction of Ludwig Wittgenstein "Philosophie" edited by Heikki Nyman (1989) which was published in 1981 *Crítica*, Lisboa: n. 6, May.

<sup>2</sup> *TS213*, #86, 406-407.

<sup>3</sup> *TS213*, #87, 408-409.

*explanations*, and in what refers to the will that the most valued explanation in use could be found in the theories of human motivation grounded upon Freudian psychoanalytic thought, the dominant trend in psychology in our *fin-de-siècle*. Of course Freudian explanations never met a solid place in my thought and Wittgenstein's arguments against this way of thinking gave me reasons to get rid of them. According to his criticism the will cannot be identified with or seen as a psychic mechanism causing voluntary actions, because underlying this idea there is a misleading analogy between the functioning of man and machine which is in the core of Freudian theories. Throughout his work Wittgenstein fights against this false analogy and against the idea which explains voluntary actions as having psychic causes that could be identified in the act of will. Among the many arguments he offers his readers to challenge this idea I would like to bring out here the comparison where he distinguishes very clearly the belonging of the words 'will' and 'phenomenon' to different spaces: "The will can't be a phenomenon, for whatever phenomenon you take is something that simply happens, something we undergo, not something we do. The will isn't something I see happen, it is more like my being involved in my actions, my being my actions".<sup>4</sup>

My second movement was an answer to my need of clearing up the ethical sense in which the word will is used by Wittgenstein which in turn addressed back to the problem of the scientific explanations we use. The young Wittgenstein developed the idea of will as the bearer of ethics. Asking about the difference in principle between the will in its ethical sense and what puts the human body in movement (desire) he comes to the conclusion that it is the will which gives significance to the things, and that without it there would not exist also this center of the world we name the I which results to be the bearer of ethics. Will and I are united. Firstly he names will above all the bearer of good and evil<sup>5</sup> and further on he asserts good and evil are in essence the I.<sup>6</sup> But, the I is not an object. We stand never in face of the I as we objectively stand in face of all objects. This leads him to the conclusion that in philosophy we can and should speak of the I in a non-psychological sense: "The philosophical I is not the man, neither the human body nor the human soul, of which psychology is concerned with, but the metaphysical subject, the boundary -- not one part -- of the

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<sup>4</sup> *PG*, #97.

<sup>5</sup> *NB*, 171. The quotations from *NB*, *TLP*, and *PI* are from 1984 Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.

<sup>6</sup> *NB*, 175.

world"<sup>7</sup>. Yet, being ethics a condition of the world of which there is nothing that can be said because it is transcendental, the same would be valid to will when identified as its bearer. Thus, it would remain a use of the word will of which we could talk about: the psychological sense<sup>8</sup>. And such conclusion seems to be in agreement with his final proposal in the *Tractatus*: the right method in philosophy would have properly nothing to say, except those propositions that can be said: the propositions of natural science<sup>9</sup>.

Despite this verdict on propositions of natural science as being the only ones that could be discussed, it is well known Wittgenstein was not interested in scientific questions but in philosophical ones. He makes clear that the spirit in which he wrote his works could not be understood by the typical western scientist, because he was not aiming at the same target they have, that means, he was not interested in building complicated structures and, as he says, because his way of thinking was different from theirs<sup>10</sup>. Besides, in different places of his work we can find how the so called scientific explanations could act as hindrances to philosophical activity, and naturally as fuel to resistances of will. For example, from his *Conversations on Freud* we can understand a philosopher must take care of morbid thought habits that can be settled down in his vision by a 'certain way of thinking' grounded upon the notions of causal law and determinism<sup>11</sup>.

We can learn also from a report of Rush Rhees<sup>12</sup> that the philosopher cannot follow the scientists' attitude and simply let his philosophical activity to run on the 'railway tracks' of 'scientific method', because the results someone obtains working under the pressure of and believing in it as the best method of acquiring knowledge could be different from the results he could obtain through philosophical methods. On the other hand, referring to the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the least possible number of primitive natural laws by means of generalizations, Wittgenstein advises us that our concern about the methods of science feeds our wish of generality, and that this desire could lead the philosopher to the irresistible temptation of asking and answering questions in the same way as scientists do. "This tendency", he says,

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<sup>7</sup> *TLP*, 5.641.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.423.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.53.

<sup>10</sup> *CV*, 7. I am quoting from the English edition by G. H. von Wright, 1980 Oxford: B. Blackwell.

<sup>11</sup> *LCA*, 41-52. I quote here the American edition by University California Press.

<sup>12</sup> Rhees, R. "Postscript" in Rush Rhees (ed.) 1984 *Recollections of Wittgenstein*, Oxford University Press, 207-208.

"is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher to complete darkness"<sup>13</sup>.

Without disagreeing with Wittgenstein's remarks about the tragic consequences resulting from using the 'railway tracks' of scientific methods, that I understand as the highly valued 'railway tracks' of a deterministic point of view in science, however due to resistances of my will imposed by this sort of scientific education, at this point of the work I found it would be impossible going on without comparing his position with another one which considers scientific methods in a more positive way. So I confronted it with Carnap's perspective without understanding it of course as a deterministic one.

Carnap and Wittgenstein had the same definition of philosophy: the logical clarification of thoughts but they did not have the same aim for the work in this activity. Although Wittgenstein shared with the Vienna Circle its aims, that means, the factual antimetaphysical research and the fight for a scientific conception of the world, he and Carnap gave different interpretations of the definition. While Wittgenstein had as a target bringing into practice the logical clarification of thoughts as having an aim in itself, on his side Carnap was interested in the use of clarity aiming at the building of complex structures<sup>14</sup>.

Carnap recognized and discussed the divergence between Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle regarding the question of building language systems in symbolic logic and it could be found, he says, in the very fact that in the Vienna Circle mathematics and empirical sciences were taken as models of the "best and most systematized form of knowledge to which all philosophical work about the problem of knowledge should be oriented"<sup>15</sup>. Taking the 'scientific method' as being "the best way of acquiring knowledge"<sup>16</sup> Carnap fought strongly for its use, and made his position very clear: "Cultivate philosophy can only consist of clarifying the concepts and propositions of science through logical analysis"<sup>17</sup>. From this perspective on he criticized Wittgenstein for having an indifferent and sometimes negative attitude towards mathematics and science which he considered harmful to the fruitfulness of his philosophical task.

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<sup>13</sup> BB, 49. I am quoting from the Portuguese edition. 1992 *O Livro Azul*, Lisboa: Edições 70.

<sup>14</sup> Haller, R. 1988 *Questions on Wittgenstein*, London: Routledge, 14. And Haller, R. 1992 *Wittgenstein in between - a fragment*. Lecture given at Instituto de Psicologia (University of São Paulo) November (Typewritten copy unpublished).

<sup>15</sup> Carnap, R. 1992 *Autobiografia Intelectual*, Barcelona: Paidós, 123.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 144.

<sup>17</sup> Carnap, R. "La Antigua y la Nueva Lógica" in Ayer, A.J. 1965 *El Positivismo Lógico*, Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica (3.repr.) 151.

Well then, if Wittgenstein's position is that the only propositions which can talk about are those of natural sciences and if these should be a result of an analysis that uses the method of logical clarification of thoughts, it seems to me hard to understand where lies its difference with Carnapian perspective. I cannot see them both doing anything different than exploring the world of logical possibilities. Wittgenstein said he was not interested in constructing a build but he also said his interest was in "having a surveyable view of the foundations of possible buildings"<sup>18</sup>. On his side Carnap investigated the logical development of possible systems and structures. To my understanding they represent a non-deterministic way of doing science in which I see each one working according to his own perspicuity. In favour of this idea I would like to mention what Carnap tells us in his *Intellectual Autobiography*. As he reports, in order to uphold conversations with his diverse friends he used different philosophical languages because he felt necessary to adjust himself to their forms of thinking or of speaking. In doing so he realized his neutral attitude regarding the diverse forms of philosophical language and formulated it as the 'principle of tolerance' which he recognized as central to his own mode of thinking and as his way of dealing with the many influences he received<sup>19</sup>.

Shortly it seems to me they both offer variations of one and the same method: language criticism as developed by Austrian philosophical tradition, and the way they used it reflects nothing more than their personal views of how to deal with grammatical facts. In this sense I cannot agree that Wittgenstein's negative attitude had been harmful to his philosophical task because nothing could be more fruitful than the medicine he gave for healing psychology from the disease he diagnosed: "In psychology there exists precisely experimental methods and conceptual confusion"<sup>20</sup>. And in what refers to Carnap is my opinion that following a different road from Wittgenstein but having in mind his suggestions about positive modes of seeing Metaphysics he was able to leave us a useful conception for the analysis of our 'metaphysical inclinations'.

According to K. T. Fann, it was suggested by Wittgenstein that despite their absurdity the ideas expressed by metaphysical statements were of greater importance because "they show clearly the grammar of some important words of our language"<sup>21</sup>. Well then, I can see this positive mode of seeing

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<sup>18</sup> CV, 7.

<sup>19</sup> Carnap, R. 1992 *Autobiografía Intelectual*, 50.

<sup>20</sup> PI, 580.

<sup>21</sup> Fann, K. T. 1992 *El Concepto de Filosofía en Wittgenstein*, Madrid: Tecnos (2.ed.), 117.

Metaphysics as developed in Carnaps *The Overcoming of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language*. In my opinion his search for distinguishing diverse components of meaning in the metaphysical (pseudo)propositions was for him a plunge into the grammar of the important metaphysical statements pointed out by Wittgenstein, and his conception of metaphysics as "the expression of an emotive attitude towards life" whose components of meaning "can have deep psychological effects"<sup>22</sup> results to be a very important instrument in the therapeutic work to be done for healing psychology from its disease.

Taking up again the beginning of this paper for reaching a conclusion. If a change of perspective in the way we see objects is a condition of philosophical activity that requires facing resistances of will, and if willing is identified with ethics, then what has to be changed are the philosopher values. And since ethics is nothing more than a form of living, what alternative could a philosopher have to solve his philosophical problems without changing his way of living? And taking Carnaps conception of metaphysical (pseudo)propositions as expressions of an emotional attitude towards life and understanding the 'railway tracks' of deterministic scientific methods as the real sources of Metaphysics, as Wittgenstein pointed out, what would be the results of an analysis that took into consideration the scientist's intellectual difficulties? Aren't they also resistances of will?

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<sup>22</sup> Carnap. R. "La Superación de la Metafísica mediante el Analisis Lógico del Lenguaje" in Ayer, A.J. 1965 *El Positivismo Lógico*, Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica (3. repr.), 85.

Peter Baumann

## "Banana, Apple or Peach?" On Rational and Intransitive Preferences

Suppose Mary now prefers a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach. Suppose further Mary is rational. Does it follow that she prefers a banana to a peach? How could she, under these circumstances, prefer a peach to a banana without being irrational? One of the most important standards for the rationality of values and preferences seems to be the axiom of transitivity:

$$(T) (x)(y)(z) ((xPy \ \& \ yPz) \rightarrow xPz)^1$$

A rational person prefers a to c if she prefers a to b and b to c.<sup>2</sup> Fulfilling the transitivity condition might not be sufficient for rationality but it seems to be necessary.

Many people think this is an obvious and fundamental truth. In Neumann and Morgenstern's *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (T) is among the axioms of the theory<sup>3</sup> and the authors take it to be "a plausible and generally accepted property".<sup>4</sup> Many authors, including von Wright<sup>5</sup>, Davidson, McKinsey and Suppes<sup>6</sup>, Jeffrey<sup>7</sup>, Nozick<sup>8</sup>, and Putnam<sup>9</sup>, agree. However, (T) leads to serious problems. My conclusion will be that transitivity is not a necessary condition for the rationality of preferences. First, I will argue for this conclusion (I). Second, I will discuss a proposal to avoid this conclusion (II).

### I

Consider the following example. Fred is doing his work and gets hungry. He decides to buy a slice of pizza for \$2 at a take-away. Before he arrives there he remembers that for only \$2 more he can get a whole plate of spaghetti at a

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<sup>1</sup> The relation P is that of strict preference and thus excludes indifference.  
<sup>2</sup> It does not matter here whether the variables 'x', 'y', 'z' range over and 'a', 'b', 'c', etc., refer to options, objects or sentences being true, etc.  
<sup>3</sup> cf. von Neumann, Morgenstern 1953, 26f.  
<sup>4</sup> von Neumann, Morgenstern 1953, 27  
<sup>5</sup> cf. von Wright 1963, 21ff.; von Wright 1972, 151f.  
<sup>6</sup> cf. Davidson, McKinsey, Suppes 1955, 142, 145f., 154f.  
<sup>7</sup> cf. Jeffrey 1974, 371  
<sup>8</sup> cf. Nozick 1993 144  
<sup>9</sup> cf. Putnam 1986, 3ff.

cheap Italian restaurant. Since \$2 do not really count for Fred and since he is much better off with a whole plate of spaghetti he changes his mind and starts walking to the restaurant. Then he has a new idea: for only \$6 he can get a saltimbocca at a trattoria nearby. Since \$2 still do not count very much for him and since he likes saltimboccas much more than spaghetti he decides to go to the trattoria. But then he remembers his first plan: he just wanted to go out and get a slice of pizza for \$2. For Fred, however, a price difference of \$4 makes a remarkable difference whereas \$2 does not; since he is not that fond of saltimboccas he decides to go back to his original plan.

What has happened here? Let:

'c' stand for 'getting pizza for \$2',

'b' stand for 'getting spaghetti for \$4' and

'a' stand for 'getting saltimbocca for \$6'.

Assume Fred's preferences have not simply changed during his deliberations (we might have independent evidence for this assumption). Then, Fred's preference ranking is the following:

$(P_1) bPc \ \& \ aPb \ \& \ cPa.$

In other words, Fred's preferences violate (T). There is no best option for Fred; rationality does not tell him which of the three options he should choose.<sup>10</sup>

Does this mean Fred is irrational? Or is there something wrong with (T)? Let us suppose a, b and c do not differ in price or in any other relevant aspect except Fred's gusto. We can call preferences between options that differ only in one relevant aspect 'one-criterion preferences'. If you prefer a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach and nothing but the taste of the fruit counts for you and if you are rational then you prefer a banana to a peach. In such cases violating (T) would be obviously irrational.

However, our original example was more complex. There are two independent relevant aspects for the decision: price and quality. Fred's preferences are (at least) 'two-criteria preferences'. Moreover, a difference of \$2 does not really count for Fred whereas a difference of \$4 does. The money-criterion is 'non-lin-

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<sup>10</sup> Many philosophers, psychologists, decision theorists and economists agree that transitivity is not necessary for the rationality of preferences: cf. Tversky 1969, 31ff.; Schauenberg 1978, 166ff.; Schumm 1987, 435ff.; Bar-Hillel, Margalit 1988, 120ff.; Fishburn 1991, 113ff.; Anand 1993, 55ff. Cf. also the discussion between Hughes 1980; Lee 1984; Philips 1989 and Rawling 1990.

ear' in the sense that doubling the expense of money does not mean doubling the negative subjective utility.

Given these explanations it seems obvious that Fred is not irrational. There is no way for him to be more rational. It is not 'his fault' that his preference ranking has the form  $(P_1)$ ; rather, the form of his preference ranking is due to the structure of the choice situation. Fred violates (T) without being irrational. Hence (T) cannot be a universal rationality constraint for preferences.

Given all these considerations it is plausible to propose the following general thesis (that cannot be proven here):

- (I)        If
- (a) the person's preferences are two-or-more-criteria preferences and if
  - (b) at least one of these criteria is non-linear to a certain degree
- then
- (c) the person's preference ranking violates (T) without the person being irrational.<sup>11</sup>

One might argue that (I) is not strong enough: (Ia) and (Ib) only imply the possibility that the person's preference ranking violates (T). Given (Ia) and (Ib) it might still be possible that  $aPb \ \& \ bPc \ \& \ aPc$ . This is the case if the following condition holds:

- (SW)        The different criteria are non-linear 'in the same way'; the non-linearity of the different criteria is such that intransitivity never arises.

Fred's desire for saltimbocca could be so strong that even spending \$4 more would not be irrational.

This objection against (I) fails. Given (Ia) and (Ib), (T) requires that ' $aPb$ ' and ' $bPc$ ' alone imply ' $aPc$ '. But this is not the case here. Only if the further condition (SW) is fulfilled can we conclude that  $aPc$ . Since we cannot take (SW) for granted in every case transitivity does not hold across the board.

If it is true that most of our preferences are more-criteria preferences and most of the criteria are non-linear then it is also plausible to assume that in many important cases (T) is no rationality constraint for preferences. Many rational preference rankings are intransitive. Only in the two special cases of one-

<sup>11</sup> cf. also Tversky 1969, 31ff., 43; Bar Hillel, Margalit 1988, 124; Philips 1989, 478.

criterion preferences and of linear multi-criteria preferences does rationality imply transitivity.

The conclusion that transitivity is no general rationality constraint is plausible but seems to have disastrous implications. Rational decisions identify one option or one group of options as the best of all available options. In the case of intransitive preferences there is no best option for the person so that she might run around in circles. Which of her options the person should choose is not a matter of rational decision. This does not mean that the person has to decide irrationally; rather, her choice of one of the options is beyond rationality or irrationality. Moreover, she does not need to run around in circles forever. Tired of deliberating, she might just pick the first option at hand. Thus, giving up (T) as a general rationality constraint does not lead to the disaster of irrationality and paralysis of decision-making. Rather, we see that rationality does not require what it seemed to require.

There is another, very common objection to my conclusion: the 'Money Pump'-argument. The objection is as follows. Suppose Fred has a preference ranking of the form  $(P_1)$ . He might agree to give one dollar to Mary if she offers him an option that is better than the one he already has. Suppose Fred starts with the option *c*. Then, he is ready to pay one dollar to Mary if she offers him the preferred option *b*. But then again, he will pay one dollar to get the preferred option *a*. Since he prefers *c* to *a* he will pay a third dollar to get option *c*, and so forth. Fred will run around in his circle of intransitivity until there is no money left to spend on the money pump. Many people think that the possibility of a money pump proves that intransitive preferences are irrational. But this objection is not convincing. First, a rational person would simply refuse to make the money pump-agreement. Second, and more important, it is a bad idea to argue for (T) by pointing out that transitivity prevents money-pumping. What we want is a theoretical argument for or against (T). The money pump-objection only offers a practical consideration concerning the possible loss of money, given intransitivity. But whether or not we lose money by acting on our preferences does not imply anything about the rationality of our preferences. Thus, the money pump-argument does not succeed in showing that intransitivity entails irrationality.<sup>12</sup>

Why does (T) seem so convincing as a universal rationality constraint? It seems to work for the most basic and simple cases: if you prefer a banana to an apple and an apple to a peach then you should also rationally prefer a banana to

<sup>12</sup> cf. also Schick 1986, 116ff.; Anand 1993, 61ff.

a peach. One might argue that if transitivity is a rationality constraint for such simple cases then it is also valid for the more complex cases. The Cartesian methodological rule to start the analysis with simple cases is, of course, the right one. However, we have seen that the simple banana-apple-peach case is not a basic but a limiting case. Thus, it can be misleading to focus on simple cases. As Wittgenstein remarked: "A main cause of philosophical disease -- a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example".<sup>13</sup>

## II

So far I have argued for the conclusion that transitivity is no general rationality constraint. This conclusion can be avoided by changing the method of description of preferences. I want to discuss such a proposal now. The basic idea is that the description must be much more fine-grained. Not only options but also the relevant aspects and criteria have to enter into the description of the preferences. Let us re-describe our first example. Instead of:

'bPc'

we have

'(getting spaghetti instead of pizza) P (keeping \$2)';

instead of

'aPb'

we have

'(getting saltimbocca instead of spaghetti) P (keeping \$2)';

and instead of

'cPa'

we have

'(keeping \$4) P (getting saltimbocca instead of pizza)';

Thus described, Fred's preference ranking is unproblematic. It has the form:

$(P_2) dPe \ \& \ fPe \ \& \ gPh.$

This is not at all paradoxical. The intransitivity vanishes if we give a fine-grained analysis of the preference ranking. We do not have to give up (T). Transitivity would still be a general rationality constraint.

<sup>13</sup> Wittgenstein 1967, 593

There is nevertheless a certain price to pay for this 'way out': transitivity loses its status too. Let us modify our original example. Assume Fred also prefers a \$6 saltimbocca to a \$2 pizza. According to the rough analysis, his preferences are transitive and have the form:

$$(P_3) \text{ bPc \& aPb \& aPc}$$

However, if we switch to the fine-grained analysis, his preference ranking has the form:

$$(P_4) \text{ dPe \& fPe \& hPg}$$

With the fine-grained analysis, not only the possibility of intransitivity but also the possibility of transitivity disappears. Preferences lose their internal connections. For our preference-triples the question of transitivity would not even arise. Transitivity would be like the Queen of England: still reigning but without much influence.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, we seem to face the following situation. We can either stick to a rough description of preferences and accept that transitivity is no general rationality constraint for preferences (or: a rationality constraint only for special cases) or we can switch to a fine-grained description of preferences and keep the principle of transitivity at the price of devaluing it. In both cases, transitivity does not play the important role it *prima facie* seems to play.

In other words: whether our preferences conform to or violate the principle of transitivity depends on how we describe them.<sup>15</sup> Under fine-grained descriptions the question of transitivity and intransitivity does not even arise. Under rough descriptions transitivity is possible but only in special cases. The main conclusion is that transitivity is no necessary condition for the rationality of preferences. This might be astonishing but it should not disturb us.

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<sup>14</sup> According to another proposal we should replace expressions of the form 'mPn' by expressions of the form

'(m when compared to n) P (n when compared to m)'.

It is obvious that this, too, avoids intransitivity. But transitivity, too, would be impossible. Furthermore, this kind of re-description violates the intuitive idea that we should not describe the things we compare in terms of the comparison itself. Cf., for a similar proposal, Lee 1984, 130ff., and, against it, Philips 1989, 481.

According to a third proposal of how to 'avoid intransitivity' apparent intransitivity might turn out to merely indicate a change of preferences during deliberation. This can, of course, happen. But one needs evidence for this claim because referring to intransitive preferences would simply beg the question. Moreover, the possibility of change of preferences in no way implies that our preferences cannot be intransitive without being irrational.

<sup>15</sup> cf. Anand 1993, 103ff.

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## The Rationality of Ends

There is a dilemma between what, with some caricature, can be called the Humean and the Kantian conceptions of ends. If ends are merely the objects of desires, they cannot be rationally criticized; if they are determined by reason, they cannot motivate.

Four strategies for resolving the dilemma are available. One is to develop the concept of desire to the point at which desires can be rationally criticized. The second is to develop the concept of reason to the point at which it includes motivational force. The third is to show how both reason and desire contribute to the determination of ends, and the fourth is to show that ends are determined otherwise than by reason or desire.

I shall adopt the first strategy. If a desire can be rationally criticized, the criticism must be by reference to a criterion. There are two criteria: associated properties and other desires.

### Associated properties

We desire things in virtue of their properties: N desires X because he believes that X has a certain property (or certain properties), 'because' here signifying the relation of basing. Call the property in virtue of which a person desires something 'the property associated with the desire' -'the associated property' for short. Likewise call his belief that the thing has that property 'the associated belief'. The best analysis of basing is as a relation of causal explanation: to say that N's mental state S is based on his mental state T is to say that the fact that N has S is explained by the fact that there is an appropriate causal chain from T to S.

The fact that we desire things in virtue of their properties provides the foundation for one form of rational criticism of desires. Here are some examples of such criticism and its effects. Suppose N desires X in virtue of P. It is then proved to him that X does not have P. Assume N accepts the proof. Then, unless N also desires X in virtue of some other property, his desire cannot continue. This impossibility is not psychological, like an inability to bring oneself to like mince: it is conceptual: an ascription of the desire to N is no longer inelligible.

Another possibility is that N is brought to see that he has mistaken the property associated with his desire: in fact he desires X in virtue of Q. If it is now

proved to him that *X* does not have *Q*, the position is as above. If he is shown that *X* does have *Q*, he may continue to desire *X*, possibly with different intensity, or his desire may cease. If for example he has been deceiving himself as to the associated property out of shame, his discovery that it is *Q* may cause his desire to stop or diminish.

The associated belief may be confused: *N* may be shown that he is representing *X* to himself in a vague or ambiguous way that fails to distinguish different properties. Clarification can have various effects. For example *N* may realize that he desires *X* only in virtue of a subclass of the properties in question, in which case the desire may continue with reduced intensity. Or he may realize that he desires *X* in virtue of some of the properties and is averse to *X* in virtue of others.

Where *N* is brought to see that, while he desires *X* in virtue of *P*, he is averse to *X* in virtue of *Q*, there are several possible consequences. (i) His desire is greater than his aversion, so he continues to desire *X*, probably with reduced intensity. (It is useful here to distinguish pro tanto desires and aversions from desires and aversions on balance.) (ii) His aversion exceeds his desire; in that case it is likely that he will stop desiring *X* or will at any rate desire it with reduced intensity. (iii) Desire and aversion are equal and cancel each other, so that he becomes indifferent to *X*. (iv) Desire and aversion are equal but do not cancel, so that he sustains mixed feelings towards *X*. (v) He searches for something that has *P* but not *Q* and, on finding one, stops desiring *X*.

These examples show the variety of ways in which desires can be rationally criticized in relation to their associated properties and the variety of effects such criticism can have. It can lead to a change in a desire's intensity, to the cessation of a desire, to the formation of a new desire or to the unintelligibility of an ascription of desire.

### **Other desires**

The second criterion for the rational criticism of desires is implicit in the example of mixed desire and aversion. *N*'s desire can be rationally criticized by reference to his other desires. The most straightforward form of such criticism is assessment of the desire's realization as compatible or incompatible with that of *N*'s other desires. Again a finding of incompatibility between two desires can have various results. *N* may continue to feel both and put up with the conflict. He may come to feel one less intensely, or stop feeling it at all. He may take steps to rid himself of one. Direct control over the desire may be impossible, but indirect steps may be available to him.

In resolving conflicts account must be taken of the fact that a person's desires are normally structured in hierarchies. There is a hierarchy of intensity: I want marmalade more than jam. There is a hierarchy of range: a desire to be a sailor encompasses more of a person's life than a desire for an afternoon nap. There is a hierarchy of orders: I want a cigarette but I want not to want to. Generally, when conflicting desires fall in the same hierarchy, it is rational to sacrifice the lower to the higher; but the position is complicated by the facts, first, that  $D_1$  may be higher than  $D_2$  in one hierarchy and lower in another (I would quite like to give up smoking but I am dying for a cigarette) and, second, that a desire may be outweighed by a sufficient number of desires lower in the same hierarchy: an aspiring monk might reject the cloister because it forecloses the satisfaction of too many shorter-term desires.

This criterion imposes no limit on the rational formation of new desires. Suppose N has just  $D_1$ ,  $D_2$  and  $D_3$ . Given  $D_1$  and  $D_2$ , it may be hard or impossible for him to achieve  $D_3$ . He therefore brings himself to replace  $D_3$  with  $D_4$ . A tension now develops or becomes apparent between  $D_2$  on the one hand and, on the other,  $D_1$  and  $D_4$ ; so N replaces  $D_2$  with  $D_5$ . By the same process N comes to substitute  $D_6$  for  $D_1$ . In this way N can rationally change all his desires, though not all at once.

It might be objected that, if the requirement of consistency is the motor of change, successive modifications will diminish to a point of reflective equilibrium. But, the objection runs, the demand for rational criticism of ends envisages rational change of a more radical kind. There are four answers to this. First, it is unclear that we do demand rational change beyond equilibrium. Second, the claim that equilibrium will be reached is an empirical speculation on scanty evidence. Third, any equilibrium is likely to be unstable and temporary: it can be upset by the development of new desires, by the withering of old or by changes in external circumstances. Fourth, the requirement of consistency is not the only motor of rational change. Suppose one of N's end-desires is for X. He may come to see that some broader state of affairs, Y, is not relevantly different from X and thus form an end-desire for Y. This is not a matter of mere consistency.

## **Rationality of ends and means**

Since desires can be rationally criticized against these two criteria, rational criticism of ends is not precluded by the conception of ends as the objects of desires. This resolves the dilemma.

The rationality of ends is sometimes seen as problematic because it is contrasted with the rationality of means, which is assumed straightforward. Deliberation of means is widely regarded as a paradigm of rationality - a fact lamented by some. I shall finish by blurring the contrast, which has three components.

The first is the thought that a means-desire has an associated belief - that its object is a means to something - and that we have a fairly clear understanding of the rationality of belief. But this fails to distinguish means-desires from end-desires: it has already been noted that every desire has an associated belief.

The second component is the reflection that the means-end relation is empirically discoverable. This empirical element, it is thought, distinguishes means-desires from end-desires and accounts for their greater tractability to rational criticism. The assumption of a tight connexion between the empirical and the rational - an assumption that is both a cause and a consequence of the success of natural science - deserves scrutiny, but a short way with this suggestion is to point out that it too fails to contrast means-desires with end-desires. Granted the property associated with a means-desire is empirical; the same may be true of an end-desire. N may desire, for itself, to drink a dry Martini: whether he drinks one can be settled by watching him.

The third component is the thought that whether or not a person desires something as an end is in a sense a brute fact. Rational criticism in accordance with the first of the two criteria proposed may lead him to revise his views as to the property associated with the desire; but, once he has clearly identified the property, he simply desires the thing in virtue of it. Here, it seems, rationality comes to an end.

The difficulty is to give a sense to 'brute' in which someone's having an end-desire is a brute fact but his having a means-desire is not. If the claim is merely that end-desires cannot, while means-desires can, be justified teleologically, it is a tautology. The suggestion may be that the bruteness belongs to the connexion between the end-desire and its associated property. But there are several rejoinders to that. First, it is hard to see in what sense the connexion can be brute, given, as has been shown, that associated properties furnish a criterion for the rationality of desires. Second, the connexion between a desire and its associated property is mediated by the associated belief: to say that N desires X in virtue of P is to say that N's desire for X is based on his belief that X has P. Third, basing is an explanatory relation: the connexion between desire and associated property is presumably not brute if the latter enters into the explanation of the former. Fourth, the previous three responses apply equally to end-desires and

*The Rationality of Ends*

means-desires.

Perhaps the claim of bruteness amounts to this. By the analysis of basing given earlier, N's desire for X, as an end, in virtue of P is based on his belief that X has P just in case the fact that N has the desire is explained by the fact that there is an appropriate causal chain from the belief to the desire. The relation between the desire and the belief thus does not consist in N's having some further mental state; in particular, it does not consist in N's having some further belief as to the relation between the two. One way of putting this is to say that the basing relation is opaque to N. The suggestion is that opacity is the same as bruteness.

But again on this interpretation the charge of bruteness applies to end-desires and means-desires alike. Indeed it applies to cases where the basing relation connects two mental states of the kind whose rationality is generally admitted to be the least problematic, namely beliefs. It might be replied that this goes to show that the above analysis of basing is wrong; but, if it is, it will not be improved by a definition that eliminates opacity. Any analysis of the relation as consisting in a belief about the relata generates an infinite regress.

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## Humane und humane Ethik

### Vorbemerkungen

Die These, welche diesem Vortrag zugrunde liegt, und die im Folgenden wenigstens ansatzweise begründet werden soll, lautet: "Die humane Ethik ist keine humane Ethik." Die Methode der Begründung ist vornehmlich die "aposteriorische".

Unter dem Kürzel einer "humanen Ethik" soll die praktische Philosophie David Humes und seiner Nachfolger, der Humaner, verstanden werden. Praktische Philosophie ist die gesamte das richtige Handeln betreffende Philosophie, v.a. die Lehre von Moral und Recht und die damit verbundenen Begründungsfragen. Der Ausdruck "humane Ethik" muß etwas ausführlicher eingeführt werden. Eine Ethik soll "human" genannt werden, wenn aus ihr hervorgeht, daß darin eine unbedingte Achtung vor dem "humanum" als solchem gefordert wird, d.h. die Schätzung eines jeden Menschen als Menschen oder "Person". Damit ein Mensch Person ist, also einzigartig, unersetzbar und selbstzwecklich, muß er über seine Geburt von menschlichen Eltern hinaus nicht noch irgendwie zusätzlich ausgezeichnet oder qualifiziert sein. "Inhumanität" im allgemeinsten Sinne liegt dann genau dort vor, wo bestimmten Menschen oder Menschengruppen diese grundsätzliche Achtung vorenthalten bzw. deren grundsätzliche Menschenwürde mißachtet wird. - Meine These von der humanen Ethik als einer inhumanen setzt die gerade kurz umrissene Bedeutung der Begriffe "Humanität" und "Inhumanität" voraus. Daß kein anderes - und vielleicht sogar adäquateres - Verständnis dieser Begriffe möglich ist, wage ich kaum zu behaupten, geschweige denn hier dafür zu argumentieren. Aber daran soll festgehalten werden: Wird "human" so oder wenigstens prinzipiell so verstanden wie dies gerade umrissen worden ist - und immerhin finden wir dieses oder ein sehr ähnliches Verständnis sehr weit verbreitet in der westlichen Geistesgeschichte (etwa in der Scholastik, bei Kant und vielen anderen humanistischen Philosophen) - dann lassen sich aus der praktischen Philosophie Humes unschwer einige inhumane Konsequenzen ableiten oder darin aufspüren, nämlich solche in bezug auf Straftäter, Staatenlose und "Nichtweiße". - Damit ist auch schon angedeutet wie der Ausdruck "aposteriorische Methode" zu verstehen ist, nämlich in dem scholastischen Sinn, wonach der Wert einer These

oder Theorie nicht aus der Kritik ihrer Voraussetzungen ("a priori"), sondern aus der ihrer Folgen bestimmt werden soll.

## I

Die erste inhumane Konsequenz betrifft das Los von Straftätern und -täterinnen und ergibt sich im Zuge der Argumentation im achten Abschnitt von Humes "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding".<sup>1</sup> Die Grundgedanken dieses berühmten Textes sind die folgenden: Die streng empiristische Beobachtung einer Billardkugel, welche eine andere anstößt, ergibt, daß eine mit Notwendigkeit wirkende Naturkraft zwischen beiden nicht wahrgenommen werden kann. Allein ein Nacheinander der Bewegungen der einen und dann der anderen könne konstatiert werden. Ein mehrmaliges Beobachten solcher Kugeln erzeugt, so Hume, eine Sehgewohnheit: Bei der Bewegung der einen auf die andere zu, erwartet man dann bereits die Bewegung der zweiten. Dieser subjektive, psychologische Erwartungszwang werde dann gleichsam "nach außen" projiziert und man glaube, auf dem grünen Filz würde der Lauf der einen Kugel den der angestoßenen sozusagen notwendigerweise "herbeizwingen". Die Analyse dessen, was sich den Sinnen wirklich zeigt, ergebe aber, daß von einer notwendigen Verbindung nicht die Rede sein könne. Zu dem gleichen Schluß gelangt aber - so Hume weiter - auch der Verstand, denn es gibt kein logisches Gesetz wonach Dinge, die oft aufeinander folgten, immer aufeinander folgen werden. Dennoch glaube man im gewöhnlichen Leben, daß die Bewegung der einen Kugel, nach dem Anstoß an die zweite, eine bestimmte Bewegung derselben hervorrufen, verursachen werde - und zwar notwendigerweise. Reflektierten die Menschen aber dann, wenn sie eigene Körperbewegungen hervorrufen, auf sich selbst, sozusagen in ihr eigenes Inneres, dann könnten sie dort oftmals keinen Zwang entdecken, keine Notwendigkeit dahingehend, warum sie z.B. einmal den rechten, dann den linken Arm heben würden: Dies sei der eigentliche Ursprung der Illusion der Willensfreiheit. In Wahrheit nämlich würden wir ebenso bei der Betrachtung von Naturereignissen wie auch bei der Beobachtung der Handlungen von Menschen jeweils nur Regelmäßigkeit wahrnehmen und zwar hier wie dort (so gut wie) ausnahmslose. Dieselben Charakteranlagen bestimmten schon von je her und bei allen Menschen und Völkern die gleichen

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<sup>1</sup> Humes Schriften werden zitiert nach: David Hume, *The Philosophical Works*, ed. by Thomas Hill Green and Thomas Hodge Grose, in 4 volumes, London 1882 (new edition). Die "Enquiry" findet sich im vierten Band, S. 1-135, der achte Abschnitt S. 65-84.

Handlungsmotive und diese wiederum in vergleichbaren Situationen vergleichbare Handlungen. Dies könne niemand leugnen und dies genüge auch zur Begründung eines philosophischen Determinismus, welcher - nach Ansicht Humes - mit dem "Common sense" durchaus vereinbar ist.

Diese Position erfordert nun für die Beurteilung eines Verbrechens, daß nicht die *e i n z e l n e T a t*, sondern der ganze *C h a r a k t e r* des Angeklagten zur Diskussion gestellt werden muß. Es wäre ganz unsinnig, nur die Tat bewerten zu wollen. Zitat: "Actions are, by their very nature, temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some *c a u s e* in the character and disposition of the person who performed them, they can neither redound [beitragen] to his honor, if good, nor infamy, if evil."<sup>2</sup> Nur weil die Tat nach einer Regel aus dem Charakter hervorgeht, ohne daß hier ein freier Willenschluß irgendwie intervenieren könnte, dürfe der Verbrecher bestraft, etwa in Gefängnisse gesperrt werden. Andernfalls könnte "die Verruchtheit" der Tat "niemals als Beweis der Verderbtheit" des Charakters dienen.<sup>3</sup>

Die Konsequenz aus alledem kann nur sein, daß der Verbrecher im Strafvollzug als "verdorbener Charakter" behandelt werden muß. Der Verurteilte und seiner Tat Überführte ist dagegen in einem *h u m a n e n* Strafvollzug als jemand zu behandeln, der für ein zu einer bestimmten Zeit (oder zu bestimmten Zeiten) begangenes Unrecht büßt und beispielsweise nach dem Ablauf seiner Strafzeit gewöhnlich wieder entlassen wird. Dabei bleibt seine Menschenwürde aber auch während des Strafvollzugs grundsätzlich unantastbar. Hume denkt sich dies alles aber offensichtlich anders: *s e i n e r* Auffassung nach muß aus der verbrecherischen Tat auf den gleichbleibenden verbrecherischen Charakter des Täters geschlossen werden; der Straf-täter wird zum "sträflichen Charakter" und mit demselben wäre dann auch dementsprechend umzugehen: u. E. eine inhumane Konsequenz seiner naturalistisch-deterministischen Philosophie.

## II

Eine weitere solche Folge ergibt sich im Anschluß an die Ausführungen Humes im II. Teil des dritten Buches seines "Treatise of Human Nature", welcher überschrieben ist mit "Of Justice and Injustice"<sup>4</sup> sowie im Anschluß an die dazu weitgehend parallelen Thesen über die Gerechtigkeit in seiner "Enquiry

<sup>2</sup> A.a.O., S. 80.

<sup>3</sup> Ebd.: "The wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of the other."

<sup>4</sup> A.a.O., vol. 2, S. 252-333.

Concerning the Principles of Morals"<sup>5</sup>. Diese Konsequenz betrifft nicht Rechtsbrecher bzw. Gefangene, sondern Menschen, welche sich außerhalb einer staatlichen Gemeinschaft befinden, also Staatenlose ebenso wie solche, die in einer Anarchie nach dem Zusammenbruch eines Staatswesens, etwa infolge eines Krieges, leben. Die Philosophen vor Hume sind sich zum allergrößten Teil (die griechischen Sophisten bilden hier eine bezeichnende Ausnahme) darin einig gewesen, daß jedem Menschen von Natur aus gewisse Grundrechte zukämen. Aristoteles unterschied erstmals deutlich das, was nach der Natur (d.h. bei ihm, gemäß der geistig-ethischen Bestimmung des Menschen) von dem, was nach menschlicher Satzung Recht ist. Die Stoa bildete diesen Gedanken weiter zu der These, es gäbe ein allgemeines Weltgesetz, welches als Natur- und Sittengesetz für alle Menschen (aller Zeiten und Erdkreise) gelte.

Paulus, Augustinus und die Kirchenväter machten daraus das ewige Gesetz Gottes, welches auch in die Herzen der Nichtchristen "eingeschrieben" sei. Die Aufklärer vor Hume wollten diese Vermischung von (Offenbarung-)Theologie und Rechtsbegründung wieder weitgehend zurücknehmen und versuchten ebenso wie die Existenz Gottes so auch die Existenz eines Naturrechts aus bloßen Vernunftgründen herzuleiten. Gewöhnlich nahmen diese Denker (Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Rousseau u.a. auf je eigene Weise) im Anschluß daran auch zu der Hypothese Zuflucht, in früher Zeit wäre ein "Gesellschaftsvertrag" abgeschlossen worden, in welchem jeder Mensch auf bestimmte Rechte, z.B. auf das der Privatjustiz, Verzicht leistete, und dieselben Rechte auf eine Person oder Instanz übertragen habe: so sei es gelungen, das Zusammenleben zu erleichtern, den Frieden zu festigen, den Handel auszudehnen usw. Diese Theorie setzt selbstverständlich voraus, daß gewisse Rechte schon vor dem Vertrag bestanden haben müssen. Man argumentierte dann beispielsweise auch wie folgt: Es zeige etwa die reine Vernunft eines jeden Menschen, daß jedem das als Eigentum gehöre, was er sich, z.B. aus Stein oder Holz, mit Mühe selbst gefertigt oder gebaut habe, daß es Unrecht sei einem anderen sein so gewonnenes Eigentum oder gar sein Leben zu nehmen - ein solcher Rechtssinn wäre Teil des allgemeinen menschlichen Vernunftvermögens, genauer, seiner "praktischen" Vernunft.

Hume bestreitet nun schon, daß ein solcher Rechtssinn eine natürliche Tugend sei und noch weit weniger will er zugestehen, daß jedem Menschen nur weil er/sie Mensch ist, schon gewisse Rechte zukämen. Recht und Unrecht gäbe es nur in einem geordneten Gemeinwesen. Zwar wäre ein gewisses Wohlwollen

<sup>5</sup> A.a.O., vol. 4, S. 179-197 ("Of Justice").

gegenüber seinen nächsten Verwandten und Freunden durchaus etwas Natürliches (Hobbes hätte ein zu misanthropisches Menschenbild vertreten wo er den Menschen im Naturzustand als ausschließlich selbstisch und sogar "wölfisch" beschrieben habe) aber ein Rechtsbewußtsein und eine natürliche Nächstenliebe seien doch ganz verschiedene Dinge. So werde auch ein gerechter Mensch von einem wohlwollenden oft nicht verstanden. Der Gerechte blicke auf das Gemeinwesen als Ganzes, bzw. auf die Regeln zum Erhalt desselben, der Wohlwollende auf den besonderen, einzelnen Fall bzw. die konkrete Person. Weder könne man aus reiner Vernunft auf ein Sollen schließen, z. B. auf ein: "Du sollst deinem Nachbarn nichts wegnehmen" - es gäbe keinen gültigen Schluß vom "ist" zum "soll" aus reiner Vernunft ("Humes Gesetz") - noch existiere ein natürlicher Gerechtigkeitssinn. Und auch das Konstrukt eines Gesellschaftsvertrags ist, gemäß Hume, eine unsinnige Erfindung, setze derselbe eben doch schon irgendeine Form von Recht oder Gerechtigkeit voraus:

"It has been asserted by some, that justice arises from HUMAN CONVENTIONS, and proceeds from the voluntary choice, consent, or combination of mankind. If by *convention* be here meant a *promise* (which is the most usual sense of the word) nothing can be more absurd than this position. The observance of promises is itself one of the most considerable parts of justice; and we are not surely bound to keep our word, because we have given our word to keep it."<sup>6</sup>

Woher kommt es dann, daß überhaupt irgendwelche Zusagen und Verträge gehalten werden, fremdes Eigentum als solches anerkannt wird usf.? Nun, im Staat aufgrund der Angst vor Sanktionen der exekutiven Gewalt aber auch vor solchen der Mitmenschen - mit einem bekannten Wortbrüchigen wird beispielsweise kaum noch jemand Geschäfte machen wollen. Im vor- oder außerstaatlichen Zustand aber dürfe ein berechnender Sinn für gemeinsame Interessen unterstellt werden, ein Sozialkalkül solcherart, daß das Einräumen von Rechten gegenüber Mitmenschen einer *K o n v e n t i o n* den Weg bereitet, die letztendlich dem ein Versprechen gebenden Menschen selber zugute kommt. Sobald dieser Nutzen allerdings nicht mehr vorausgesehen werden kann, fällt auch die potentielle Verpflichtung fort, den anderen als Rechtssubjekt anzusehen:

"The USE and TENDENCY of that virtue [Gerechtigkeit] is to procure [herbeiführen] happiness and security, by preserving order in

<sup>6</sup> A.a.O., vol. 4, S. 274.

society: But where the society is ready to perish from extreme necessity, no greater evil can be dreaded from violence and injustice; and every man may now provide for himself by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit."<sup>7</sup>

Die Menschlichkeit ("humanity"), von der hier die Rede ist, stellt nach Humes Auffassung ein weitgehend allgemein verbreitetes Sympathiegefühl von Menschen gegenüber Mitmenschen dar, birgt aber in sich keinerlei Rechte und Pflichten. Denken wir etwa an die Kriegsgebiete, in denen die staatliche Ordnung zur Zeit tatsächlich zusammengebrochen ist, so müßten wir als Humeaner einräumen, daß die geplagten Menschen dort keinerlei Rechte auf Leben, Unversehrtheit, menschenwürdige Behandlung, Eigentum usw. haben. Da die überlegenen Angreifer womöglich keinen Nutzen am Zustandekommen von Rechtskonventionen sehen, sind die Bekriegtten, nicht nur *de facto*, sondern auch *de iure*, auf das angeblich allgemeine, zwischenmenschliche Wohlwollen der Soldaten angewiesen: u.E. eine weitere inhumane und dieses Mal geradezu zynische Konsequenz der Humeschen (Rechts-)Philosophie...

### III

Hume, der Erkenntnistheoretiker, faßt das menschliche Erkenntnisvermögen als ein Produkt der Natur auf, dessen Zuverlässigkeit gerade so weit reicht wie es für das Überleben bei der Masse (und für das Wohlleben beim "Weisen" - dem Philosophen Humescher couleur) von Vorteil ist. Fragen, die darüber hinausstreben, müssen von einer anderen Instanz als der menschlichen Vernunft beantwortet werden. Welche aber kann dafür infrage kommen? Wie schon der antike Skeptiker Sextus Empiricus verfällt auch Hume auf die Antwort: Die Natur, die Instinkte, Landessitten, gesunder Menschenverstand und v.a. "allgemeine Ansichten":

"The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals 'tis perfectly infallible."<sup>8</sup>

Mit solchen Äußerungen wurde Hume, philosophiegeschichtlich betrachtet, zum Vater der schottischen Common-sense-Philosophie (Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Stewart, Hamilton und andere mehr). Der bekannteste Vertreter dieser Schule, Thomas Reid, ist ein begeisterter, wenn auch kritischer Leser Humes (seine Kritik richtete sich stets gegen diejenigen Passagen in Humes Werken, welche

<sup>7</sup> A.a.O., vol. 4, S. 182.

<sup>8</sup> A.a.O., vol. 2, S. 316.

seines Erachtens Gefahren für die christliche Religion in sich bergen). In einem bekannten Brief an Hume schreibt er, er würde sich immer als sein "Schüler in der Metaphysik" betrachten und er hätte aus den Schriften Humes mehr über Philosophie gelernt als von allen anderen Philosophen zusammen.<sup>9</sup> Aus diesen und anderen Gründen kann Reid wohl mit einigem Recht als "Humeaner" bezeichnet werden. Das Hauptkennzeichen seiner Philosophie ist es, daß er stets den sogenannten gesunden und allgemein verbreiteten "Common sense" gegen die sogenannte abstrakte (ungesunde) Vernunft und die seiner Auffassung nach größtenteils abwegigen bis buchstäblich krankhaft verrückten Ideen der Philosophen von Profession verteidigen und ausspielen will: Grundlage jeder "gesunden Philosophie" sei eben der Common sense. Dieser, wie gesagt, seinem Ursprung nach, Humesche Gedanke ist dann mit einiger zeitlicher Verzögerung über den Atlantik nach Amerika hinüberdiffundiert, wo er wiederum einige bedeutende<sup>10</sup> und einige andere, sehr prekäre Konsequenzen zeitigte. Dort, und besonders in den Südstaaten, galt es nämlich als allgemeine Ansicht, "general opinion" oder "Common sense", daß Afrikaner weißhäutigen Amerikanern in jeder, es sei denn, rein physischer Hinsicht deutlich unterlegen sind; somit bestehe auch in der Sklaverei nichts sittlich Verwerfliches. Hume hat diese Auffassung übrigens auch persönlich unterstützt. In dem Essay "Of National Characters" findet sich eine Fußnote, die als "Hume's Doctrine" eine "zentrale Rolle in Nordamerikas rassistischer Literatur" gespielt hat.<sup>11</sup> Das Zitat ist so schlimm, daß nur der Anfang zitiert werden soll:

"I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (...) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturers among them, no arts no science."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Vgl. Letter to David Hume, in: Thomas Reid, *Philosophical Works*, hg. von William Hamilton, Edinburgh 1895, vol. 1, S. 91 f.

<sup>10</sup> Bedeutende u.a. durch den Einfluß dieser Philosophie auf Thomas Jefferson und seinem Vertrauten Thomas Paine, dessen Traktat mit dem Titel "Common Sense" geradezu der Funke war, der zur Amerikanischen Revolution und Unabhängigkeit geführt hatte. Die Schrift kam am 10.1.1776 aus der Presse und "became overnight a best-seller; shortly after its publication almost a half a million copies were sold, and many of its most trenchant [scharf] paragraphs were reprinted in newspapers all over the country." (Philip S. Foner, *The Age of Reason* by Thomas Paine, Introduction, New York 1991, S. 12).

<sup>11</sup> Vgl. G. Streminger, *David Hume. Sein Leben und sein Werk*, Paderborn u.a. 1994, S. 598.

<sup>12</sup> A.a.O., vol. 3, S. 252.

Die Thematik "Rassismus und Common Sense-Ethik" und zugleich den ganzen Vortrag abschließend, sollen nun noch einige Passagen aus dem Buch "Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft" von Max Horkheimer zitiert werden, die aufschlußreicher und eindrucksvoller sind als es alle möglichen Schlußbemerkungen aus meiner eigenen Feder sein könnten:

"Charles O'Connor, ein berühmter Rechtsanwalt der Periode vor dem Bürgerkrieg, der einmal von einer Fraktion der Demokratischen Partei als Präsidentschaftskandidat aufgestellt war, argumentierte (nachdem er die Segnungen der Zwangssklaverei umrissen hatte) folgendermaßen: »Ich bestehe darauf, daß die Negersklaverei nicht ungerecht ist; sie ist gerecht, weise und wohlthätig ... Ich bestehe darauf, daß die Negersklaverei ... von der Natur verordnet ist ... Indem wir uns dem klaren Dekret der Natur und Gebot g e s u n d e r Philosophie beugen, müssen wir jene Institution als gerecht, wohlthätig, gesetzlich und angebracht erklären.« [...] Ein anderer Wortführer der Sklaverei, Fitzhugh, Verfasser der *Sociology for the South*, scheint sich zu erinnern, daß Philosophie einmal für konkrete Ideen und Prinzipien einstand, und er greift sie deshalb im Namen des gesunden Menschenverstandes an: »Menschen mit gesundem Urteil geben gewöhnlich falsche Gründe für ihre Meinungen an, weil sie keine abstrakten Denker sind ... Die Philosophie schlägt sie im Argumentieren glatt aus dem Felde; dennoch haben Instinkt und gesunder Menschenverstand recht, und die Philosophie hat unrecht. Die Philosophie hat immer unrecht, Instinkt und gesunder Menschenverstand haben immer recht, weil die Philosophie unachtsam ist und von engen und unzulänglichen Prämissen aus schlußfolgert.« [Und Horkheimer fügt hinzu:] "Aus Furcht vor idealistischen Prinzipien, dem Denken als solchem, Intellektuellen und Utopisten, ist der Verfasser stolz auf seinen gesunden Menschenverstand, der in der Sklaverei kein Unrecht sieht."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Max Horkheimer, Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 6, hg. von, Alfred Schmidt, S. 45f.

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## **Die Wissenschaft im Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Partikularinteressen und Allgemeininteresse**

Die grossen Hoffnungen, welche frühere Generationen dem Fortschritt der Naturwissenschaften gegenüber hegten, haben sich in diesem ausgehenden 20. Jahrhundert in Zweifel, wenn nicht sogar in offene Ängste verwandelt. Diese Ängste haben viele Menschen dazu geführt, die Naturwissenschaften als solche abzulehnen. Die moderne Naturwissenschaft erscheint vielen Zeitgenossen nicht mehr, wie dies noch für Bacon oder Descartes der Fall war, als die Befreierin der Menschheit aus ihrem Elend, sondern sie ist für viele eine der, wenn nicht sogar die Ursache des gegenwärtigen sozialen und ökologischen Elends geworden. Die Anwendung der Ergebnisse der Naturwissenschaften haben die moderne Technologie ins Leben gerufen, und diese Technologie führt zu einem Abbau der Arbeitsplätze und zur Produktion von umwelt- und gesundheitsgefährdenden Stoffen. Der Fortschritt der Wissenschaft, und vor allem der Fortschritt der Anwendungen der Ergebnisse der Wissenschaften, hat zwar einerseits zu einer wesentlichen Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen geführt, aber er hat andererseits auch zu neuen Problemen geführt. Die Wohltaten der Technologie werden oft durch grosse Katastrophen bezahlt. Darüberhinaus öffnet die moderne Wissenschaft die Möglichkeit einer immer effizienteren Kontrolle über das Individuum -man denke hier nur an die Humangenetik oder an die Informationstechnologien. Erschien die Naturwissenschaft einst als der Weg zu einer besseren, menschengerechteren Welt, so wird sie heute zum Sinnbild eines möglichen selbstverschuldeten Untergangs der Menschheit.

Diese Entwicklung ist in erster Linie durch die Tatsache bedingt, dass die Wissenschaft und die Technologie nur noch vordergründig dem Allgemeininteresse dienen, in Wirklichkeit aber unter die Kontrolle von Partikularinteressen -vornehmlich wirtschaftlicher, aber auch militärischer Natur- geraten sind. Dies ist heutzutage besonders deutlich auf dem Gebiet der angewandten Molekularbiologie, d.h. der Gentechnik zu sehen. Die gentechnische Manipulation des Erbguts von Pflanzen wird zwar desöfteren im Namen bestimmter Allgemeininteressen gerechtfertigt -z.B. im Namen des Kampfes gegen den Hunger-, aber in Wirklichkeit stehen die wirtschaftlichen Interessen bestimmter Firmen im Vor-

dergrund. Firmen, die auf dem Gebiet der Gentechnik aktiv sind, denken in erster Linie an die möglichen wirtschaftlichen Profite, die sie mittels der neuen Technologie erzielen können. Die Sicherheit der Bevölkerung, oder die sozio-ökonomischen Konsequenzen für Entwicklungsländer werden, wenn überhaupt, nur am Rande berücksichtigt. Um dies zu beweisen, genügt es darauf hinzuweisen, dass heutzutage viele Firmen darauf drängen, die Gesetzgebung betreffend die Freisetzung und Vermarktung gentechnisch manipulierter Pflanzen oder Produkte aufzulockern, und dies obwohl noch nicht bewiesen ist, dass die gentechnisch manipulierten Lebewesen keine qualitativ neue Gefahr für den Menschen und die Umwelt darstellen. Stünde hier wirklich das Allgemeininteresse im Mittelpunkt, so würden die auf dem Gebiet der Gentechnik führenden Firmen der Sicherheit eine viel grössere Bedeutung einräumen, als sie dies im Augenblick tun.

Wenn die Wissenschaft und die Technologie heute immer mehr in Bedrängnis geraten, wenn sie sich in einer sich stets vertiefenden Legitimationskrise befinden, dann zum grossen Teil deshalb, weil sie unter die Kontrolle von Partikularinteressen geraten sind. Diese Partikularinteressen können unter Umständen mit dem Allgemeininteressen übereinstimmen, sie müssen es aber nicht. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wichtig darauf hinzuweisen, dass sich die Wissenschaften nur deshalb in dem uns heute bekannten Masse entwickeln konnten, weil sie durch Partikularinteressen -und vornehmlich durch wirtschaftliche Partikularinteressen- instrumentalisiert werden konnten. Die Verstrickung von Wissenschaft und Partikularinteressen darf also nicht nur im Lichte der negativen Konsequenzen betrachtet werden. Es geht vielmehr darum, die Wissenschaft wieder unter die Kontrolle von gesellschaftlich vermittelten Partikularinteressen zu bringen. Heute ist die Situation aber derart, dass die Abhängigkeit der Wissenschaft von unvermittelten Partikularinteressen die Menschheit an den Rand des Abgrunds zu bringen droht. Angesichts dieser Situation ist es wichtiger denn je, dass sich die Wissenschaft und die Technologie aus der fast exklusiven Kontrolle durch unvermittelte Partikularinteressen befreien, und dass sie sich wieder dem Allgemeininteressen verpflichten..

Das grosse Problem bei der Orientierung am Allgemeininteressen besteht allerdings darin, dass es heute nicht mehr möglich ist davon auszugehen, dass es ein von jedem anerkanntes Allgemeininteresse gibt, bzw. dass das Allgemeininteresse sich eindeutig inhaltlich bestimmen lässt. Sowohl die Befürworter wie auch die Gegner der Gentechnik berufen sich auf das Wohl der Menschheit, die ersten, um zu behaupten, dass die Gentechnik dem Wohl der Menschheit förderlich ist, die anderen, um zu behaupten, dass die Gentechnik die Menschheit

an den Rand des Abgrunds führen wird. Ähnliches gilt für die in-vitro Befruchtung: ihre Befürworter behaupten, sie würde die Frauen befreien, während ihre Gegner behaupten, sie würde einerseits die Frauen unter die Kontrolle der Ärzte bringen, und andererseits den Weg für eine effiziente eugenische Bevölkerungspolitik öffnen. Und auch die mittels der neuen Reproduktionstechnologien mögliche Eugenik wird unterschiedlich bewertet: Die einen sehen in ihr eine Wohltat, die vielen Menschen Leid ersparen kann, während die anderen sie als das Übel schlechthin betrachten.

Wenn Wissenschaft und Technologie heute auf ein Allgemeininteresse verpflichtet werden sollen, dann kann dieses Allgemeininteresse nicht mehr ein fach als existent vorausgesetzt werden. Es gibt heute kein inhaltlich bestimmtes Allgemeininteresse mehr, das als impliziter, fragloser Hintergrund unserer Lebenswelt angesehen werden könnte. Das Zeitalter der grossen Ideologien, die das Wohl der Menschheit metaphysisch zu bestimmen versuchten, ist endgültig vorüber. Wir können nicht mehr hoffen, ein von jedem anerkanntes Gutes zu entdecken. Wir sollten allerdings die Hoffnung nicht aufgeben, ein von jedem anerkanntes Gerechtes zu finden. Die inhaltliche Bestimmung des Allgemeininteresses muss heute andauernd neu geschehen, wobei sich die Frage stellt, wer dazu befugt ist, diese Bestimmung vorzunehmen. Betrachtet man die Situation, wie sie im Augenblick besteht, so muss festgestellt werden, dass die inhaltliche Bestimmung des Allgemeininteresses nicht durch diejenigen vorgenommen wird, die durch die Entwicklung und Anwendung von Wissenschaft und Technologie unmittelbar in ihrem alltäglichen Leben betroffen sind, sondern durch diejenigen, deren Partikularinteressen durch die Entwicklung und Anwendung von Wissenschaft und Technologie gefördert werden. So entscheiden z.B. nicht die Konsumenten unmittelbar darüber, welche Lebensmittel mit Hilfe der Gentechnik 'optimiert' werden sollen, sondern die auf dem Gebiet der Gentechnik führenden Firmen. Es sind auch die Wissenschaftler und Ärzte, und nicht die werdenden Mütter, die darüber entscheiden, welche Wege in der Reproduktionsmedizin erforscht, und welche Wege vernachlässigt werden.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist es wichtig, das Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit neu zu überdenken. Ein Forscher hat sicherlich ein Interesse daran, selbst darüber zu bestimmen, worüber er forschen wird. Allerdings begründet dieses legitime Interesse noch kein absolutes Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit, zumal dann nicht, wenn diese Forschung anwendungsbezogen ist, wie dies heute fast auf allen Gebieten der Naturwissenschaften der Fall ist. Dabei ist zu bemerken, dass Forschungsfreiheit nur bedeuten kann, dass es letztendlich der Forscher ist, der darüber bestimmt, was wahr und was falsch ist, und nicht die öffentliche Mei-

nung oder eine politische oder religiöse Instanz. Auch wenn dem Forscher nicht vorgeschrieben werden kann, was als wahr und was als falsch zu gelten hat, so kann ihm trotzdem von der demokratischen Öffentlichkeit vorgeschrieben werden, was er erforschen darf, und welche Mittel -z.B. Humanexperimente- er bei seiner Forschung benutzen darf, bzw, was als unzulässig zu betrachten ist.

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die moderne wissenschaftliche Forschung in einem immer grösseren Masse durch Partikularinteressen instrumentalisiert wird -wie etwa aus der Tatsache hervorgeht, dass immer mehr hochspezialisierte Forscher für die Privatindustrie arbeiten-, kann das Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit nicht mehr als Argument angeführt werden, um eine öffentliche Kontrolle der Forschung abzulehnen. Im Gegenteil, die Forschung wird erst dann wieder frei sein können, wenn sie sich von den Partikularinteressen befreit, in deren Dienst sie im Augenblick steht, und wenn sie sich wieder dem Allgemeininteresse verpflichtet. Die Forschung kann nur als demokratisch legitimierte Forschung frei sein. Und diese Legitimierung kann nicht mehr eine materiale sein, sondern sie lässt sich nur noch als formale denken. Legitim ist die Wissenschaft nicht schon, wenn sie der Förderung des Wohls der Menschheit dient -oder behauptet, dass dieser Förderung oder irgendeinem anderen Wert dient. Legitim ist sie nur dann, wenn sie konsensfähig ist.

Es muss hier nachdrücklich darauf hingewiesen werden, dass die moderne Wissenschaft nicht mehr nur der Suche nach der theoretischen Wahrheit verpflichtet ist. Sie ist keine rein kontemplative Forschung mehr, sondern sie ist schon ihrem Wesen nach auf die Anwendung ausgerichtet. Die Technologie existiert nicht neben der modernen Wissenschaft, sondern die moderne Wissenschaft ist technologisch. Sie gewinnt ihre Erkenntnisse durch Rückgriff auf die Technologie, und diese Erkenntnisse schaffen neue Technologien. Durch sie soll der Mensch nicht nur die Wahrheit erkennen, sondern diese Erkenntnis der Wahrheit soll es ihm auch erlauben, sich in der Welt einzurichten, zum Beherrscher und Besitzer der Natur zu werden, wie Descartes es schon mit aller Deutlichkeit im 17. Jahrhundert formuliert hat. Damit gewinnt die Wissenschaft aber eine ethische Dimension. Die Wissenschaft wird zu einem Instrument, das uns dabei behilflich sein soll, das gute Leben zu verwirklichen. Was das gute Leben allerdings ist, kann die Wissenschaft von sich aus nicht bestimmen. Diese Bestimmung ist vielmehr die zentrale Aufgabe von all denjenigen, die an diesem guten Leben teilnehmen sollen. Alle Betroffenen müssen darüber mitentscheiden können, welche Wege die Wissenschaft einschlagen soll, auf welchen Gebieten die Forschung vorangetrieben, und auf welchen Gebieten sie eingestellt werden soll.

Wenn die Wissenschaftler ein Interesse daran haben, ihre Forschung frei treiben zu können, so haben sie auch ein diesem Interesse vor- oder übergeordnetes Interesse, nämlich ein Interesse daran, dass ihre Forschungstätigkeit legitimiert ist. Insofern es keine allgemein anerkannten Hintergrundwerte mehr gibt, die als implizite Legitimationsquelle dienen könnten, und insofern die Orientierung an Partikularinteressen allmählich zu einem Legitimationsschwund führt, da diese Orientierung destruktive Konsequenzen hat, kann die Wissenschaft nur dadurch ihre Legitimität wiedererlangen, dass sie sich dem kritischen Diskurs aller Betroffenen stellt. Da sie heute kaum bereit ist, dies freiwillig zu tun, kann es durchaus legitim sein, sie politisch -und 'politisch' kann hier nur heißen 'im Hinblick auf die Polis, d.h. auf das Allgemeininteresse'- dazu zu verpflichten.

Dies könnte etwa dadurch geschehen, dass ein selektives Moratorium ausgesprochen wird, wonach bestimmte Forschungen, bzw. bestimmte Anwendungen verboten werden. Oder es könnten auch bestimmte Verbote in das Grundgesetz festgeschrieben werden. Allerdings sind solche rechtlich-politische Aktionen nur dann sinnvoll, wenn sie im Rahmen einer konzertierten Aktion aller Staaten durchgeführt werden. Eine Wissenschaft, die sich wirklich dem Allgemeininteresse verpflichtet fühlt, muss sich auch über nationale Partikularinteressen stellen.

Es ist davon auszugehen, dass sich viele Wissenschaftler gegen solche Massnahmen aussprechen werden, wobei sie sich u.a. auf das schon vorher erwähnte Recht auf Forschungsfreiheit berufen werden. Insofern hier ein fundamentales Recht in Anspruch genommen wird, muss auch die Gegenargumentation stark sein. Und hier scheint die diskurstheoretische Kategorie der Strategiekonterstrategie anwendbar zu sein.

Es ist zunächst einmal festzustellen, dass das Handeln der meisten Wissenschaftler heute kaum den Kriterien des kommunikationellen Handelns gerecht wird. Wir haben es vielmehr mit rein strategischem Handeln zu tun, und zwar vor allem in denjenigen Fällen, in denen der Wissenschaftler im Dienste eines Privatunternehmens steht, oder sogar im Rahmen eines joint venture mit an der Spitze eines solchen Unternehmens steht. Die wissenschaftlich-wirtschaftliche Rationalität hat hier jede Spur von kommunikationeller oder ethischer Rationalität verloren. Die Forschung verpflichtet sich nicht mehr in erster Linie dem reflektierten Allgemeinwohl und der ethischen Akzeptabilität der aus ihr hervorgehenden Technologien, sondern der Rentabilisierung des Unternehmens. Diese Verstrickung von Wissenschaft und Wirtschaft ist einer der wichtigsten Faktoren die dazu geführt haben, dass die Wissenschaften die öffentliche Kon-

trolle dulden müssen. Wenn die Wissenschaft sich einer Form des strategischen Handelns verschreibt, und wenn sie sich in den Dienst von unvermittelten Partikularinteressen stellt, so dass sie keinen reflektierten Konsens über die von ihr entwickelten Produkte oder Verfahren sucht, dann ist der Staat -als Vertreter der Allgemeinheit- dazu berechtigt, wenn nicht sogar verpflichtet, konterstrategisches Handeln anzuwenden, und die sich anarchisch, unter dem Impuls der Partikularinteressen entwickelnde Dynamik der Wissenschaften zu bremsen. Der Staat kann nicht warten, bis sich ein allgemeiner Konsens bezüglich eines Moratoriums herausgebildet hat. Ein solches Moratorium muss vielmehr von ihm durchgesetzt werden. Allerdings müssen solche Massnahmen durch eine breite öffentliche Diskussion begleitet werden. Es müssen gleichfalls Strukturen geschaffen werden, die garantieren, dass langfristig gesehen der Konsens über die Anwendungen bestimmter risikobehafteter Technologien der tatsächlichen Anwendung dieser Technologien vorausgeht. Zu den Aufgaben des Staates gehört desweiteren, die Bildung von naturwüchsigen Sachzwängen soweit wie möglich zu verhindern. Strategischkonterstrategisches Handeln, obwohl es unmittelbar der Forderung nach einer konsensuellen Lösung nicht gerecht wird, bleibt aber trotzdem der Idee einer konsensuellen Entscheidungsfindung im Rahmen einer idealen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft verpflichtet.

Es soll abschliessend darauf hingewiesen werden, dass eine Orientierung am Allgemeininteresse keinesfalls bedeutet, dass die Partikularinteressen einfach verschwinden sollen. Es geht vielmehr darum, die Partikularinteressen im Rahmen eines gesellschaftlichen Diskurses zu vermitteln. Das Allgemeininteresse lässt sich nämlich nicht anders bestimmen denn als die Gesamtheit der vermittelten Partikularinteressen. Insofern befindet sich die Wissenschaft in einem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Partikularinteressen und Allgemeininteresse. Faktisch steht sie im Dienste von unvermittelten Partikularinteressen. Sie ist sich aber der Tatsache bewusst, dass sie sich, wenn sie als legitim erscheinen will, auf das Allgemeininteresse beziehen muss. Da sie aber kein vorgefertigtes Allgemeininteresse vorfindet, und wenn sie sich von ihrem ideologischen Schleier - oder von ihren 'edlen Lüge'- befreien will, dann kann sie dies nur dadurch erreichen, dass sie sich nur noch in den Dienst von gesellschaftlich vermittelten Partikularinteressen stellt.

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## Autonomy and Externalism<sup>1</sup>

Our culture places a high value upon personal autonomy. In this essay I try to apply Wittgenstein's general remark "Ein >innerer Vorgang< bedarf äußerer Kriterien" (PU, 580) to the contemporary debate on personal autonomy and moral responsibility in analytical philosophy.

### I

I start with a declaration of Harry Frankfurt: "[...] to the extent that a person identifies himself with the springs of his action, he takes responsibility for those actions and acquires moral responsibility for them; moreover, *the questions of how the actions and his identifications with their springs are caused are irrelevant* to the questions of whether he performs the actions freely or is morally responsible for performing them." (1975, 54; my italics) And elsewhere, he adds: "The determining conditions that are pertinent here are exclusively *structural* arrangements. I mention this, [...], since it bears on the familiar issue of whether *historical* considerations—especially causal stories—have any essential relevance to questions concerning whether a person's actions are autonomous." (1987, 171, note 13) According to Frankfurt, then, the causal history or genesis of desires of whatever order clearly has no role whatsoever to play in the constitution of autonomy (and responsibility). A person's possibility of reflexive *identification with or endorsement of* his motivational make-up is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for the autonomy of his motives. The harmony or coherence between first-order desires and second-order volitions—volitional harmony—is *entirely sufficient* for autonomy. (Cf. Frankfurt 1971)

The 'virtues' of Frankfurt's hierarchical model are well known. It elegantly answers the classical question: How is personal autonomy possible, given the biological, psychological and social conditioning of persons? For identification and volitional harmony are perfectly *compatible* with whatever kind of determinism. In this sense, Frankfurt's compatibilist hierarchical analysis is a natu-

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realistic analysis to be contrasted with, for example, a Kantian theory of noumenal freedom or a Chisholmian libertarian analysis in terms of contra-causal freedom. Yet Frankfurt's hierarchical model also has its 'vices': next to its standard difficulties—the problems of identification (infinite regress) and normativity—(cf. Cuypers 1992), the model also specifically faces, according to many other participants in the debate on autonomy and responsibility, the important problem of *manipulation*. It is, I think, instructive to situate this problem in a wider philosophical context and to describe it as a version of the problem of internalism.

## II

The 'internalism/externalism' controversy is best known in relation to theories about the meaning of words and the content of thoughts. According to externalist theories of linguistic meaning (and mental content), the meaning of words *essentially* depends upon causal relations with objects in the external world, or even upon causal interactions with other people in the linguistic community. In Hilary Putnam's laconic phrase: "Cut the pie any way you like, 'meanings' just ain't in the *head*!" (1975, 227) A distinction is sometimes made between 'perceptual' externalism and 'social' externalism: thought-contents necessarily either depend upon things perceived or, alternatively, upon what is present to other people's minds. Putnam is the most well-known proponent of the former view, while Saul Kripke (1982) is the canonical representative of the latter variety of externalism. The later Wittgenstein can retrospectively be interpreted as combining both forms of externalism: not only 'the natural history of mankind' but also 'forms of life' are necessary conditions for the constitution of meaning and content.

Now the 'internalism/externalism' distinction is, to my mind, also applicable to the debate on personal autonomy. If externalism about autonomy means that the constitution of autonomy *necessarily* encompasses causal connections with (a) the external world and (b) other people, then Frankfurt's hierarchical model is a version of what I propose to call *free-will internalism*. The internalist's position is elegantly summarized in Frankfurt's saying: "I always thought that I am pretty much self-contained!" (personal conversation)

Quite recently Frankfurt's free-will internalism has come under attack. Against Frankfurt's hierarchical model the objection of internalism has been levelled based upon *historical or genetic* considerations. It is argued that causal or historical features—a kind of *external* features—are all-important and pivotal

to the constitution of autonomy and responsibility. (Cf. Christman 1991, Buss 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1994) According to historical accounts of autonomy (and responsibility), autonomy is *essentially* a historical phenomenon in the sense that the type of process of preference-formation (in the past)—how preferences came about—is vital to the presence or absence of autonomy (now). Although all preferences have a causal origin, only autonomous preferences have the right kind of causal history—their formation-process is free from subversive causal influences.

By contrast and as amply illustrated by the quotations with which I begun, Frankfurt does not at all take into account the causal genesis or history of preferences (volitions or effective desires): autonomy is just a matter of harmoniously ‘meshing’ higher-order and lower-order attitudes *at a given moment*. Consequently, his hierarchical model is a ‘current time-slice’ approach—in other words, autonomy is a ‘snapshot’ or ‘instant’ notion. Or again: being autonomous is a purely structural phenomenon defined in terms of a particular pattern of instant properties. Against this free-will internalism the proponents of a historical approach to autonomy point out the problem of manipulation: higher-order and lower-order elements can be in a harmonious mesh *although* the harmony is causally produced by an intuitively ‘autonomy-thwarting’ process. Before elaborating on this problem, I indicate another way in which Frankfurt’s model might be objectionably internalist.

Frankfurt’s hierarchical analysis of autonomy not only leaves out the external world but also other people. Nothing analogous to ‘social’ externalism is present in his model of the autonomous self. In this matter, Frankfurt’s individualistic picture sharply contrasts with Charles Taylor’s social picture of authenticity. According to Taylor (1991), a person’s authenticity—his ‘real’ and ‘true’ autonomy—*necessarily* depends upon his dialogical relations with other people. Dialogue with and recognition by others belong to the very possibility conditions of the idea of authenticity. (Cf. Cuypers 1995) If this is correct, then Frankfurt’s individualistic model turns out to be insufficient. For Frankfurt holds that *nothing* about other people is presupposed when a person critically reflects upon his own desires and forms his second-order volitions—identification and volitional harmony are entirely sufficient for autonomy.

### III

According to Marina Oshana a naturalized analysis of autonomy can be naturalistic either (a) in a weak or (b) in a strong sense depending upon the condi-

tions it satisfies. If an analysis satisfies the first condition that "the properties which constitute autonomy must be *natural properties*, knowable through the senses or by introspection (or must supervene on natural properties)" (Oshana 1994, 77; my italics), then it is only naturalistic in the weak sense. If an analysis also satisfies the second condition that "the properties that constitute autonomy must not be restricted to phenomena 'internal' to the agent" and, consequently, that "in addition, certain objective, '*external properties* are required" (idem), then it is fully naturalistic—naturalistic in the strong sense. Accordingly, it follows from the preceding that Frankfurt's analysis of autonomy is naturalistic in the weak but not in the strong sense. Although Frankfurt's hierarchical model fulfils the first naturalistic condition, it does not fulfil the second externalistic condition. Now proponents of a historical approach to autonomy argue for the *necessity* of the strong externalistic condition by raising the objection of manipulation against an internalistic approach even if free-will internalism is already naturalistic in the weak sense.

In a nutshell, the problem of manipulation is this. A person's identification and volitional harmony can, without his knowledge, be caused by processes such as secret hypnosis, subliminal advertising/messages, clandestine electronic brainstimulation, unperceived brainwashing, concealed conditioning, etc. These disguised processes and mechanisms not only tamper with first-order desires, but also with second-order volitions and the relations between lower and higher orders. In other words, they interfere as much with the desires a person 'has' as with his reflexive capacities to identify with them. Now the objection from manipulation is squarely based upon *the strong intuition that these manipulative mechanisms radically undermine autonomy*. Consequently, since identification and volitional harmony are compatible with these 'autonomy-thwarting' mechanisms, identification and volitional harmony *cannot be sufficient* for autonomy. The further claim based on the problem of manipulation is then that (causal) historical or genetic considerations have to be brought in to adequately account for autonomy.

#### IV

Frankfurt himself reflected on the issue whether the problem of manipulation would be damaging to his analysis of autonomy and responsibility. (1975, 52-54) He distinguishes between two types of manipulation by an external agency, fancifully called the Devil/neurologist (D/n). (a) The 'marionette' case is a case of *continuous* manipulation in which the D/n intervenes in the life of the victim

at every occasion (compare with 'occasionalism'). (b) The 'being programmed' case is a case of *pre-installed or pre-fixed* manipulation in which the D/n in the beginning accommodates the victim with a stable character or program that ever thereafter determines his life (compare with 'pre-established harmony'). Although Frankfurt argues that neither of these two types of manipulation critically challenge his 'pure mesh' or 'current time-slice' approach to autonomy, there still remain, I think, serious difficulties.

With regard to the 'marionette' case Frankfurt judges that the case is irrelevant to the issue of autonomy because the victim is not even a person. However, this judgement begs the issue, since Frankfurt allows the victim to have complex states of mind such as second-order volitions which define personhood. Furthermore, from the *subjective* standpoint of the victim and according to Frankfurt's own criteria for autonomy, the marionette *actually is* autonomous at a certain time if the internal 'identification/volitional harmony' condition is fulfilled at that time. Frankfurt remarks that from the objective standpoint of the observer "[the victim's] *history* is utterly episodic and without inherent connectedness." (53; my italics) But it is not at all clear why manipulation by the D/n has to exclude connectedness 'from the inside' and eliminate subjective personal continuity. Moreover, and most surprisingly, the lack of an objective personal history is, according to Frankfurt's judgement, *sufficient* to withhold the ascription "autonomous person" from the victim. But is it not at all transparent why such a historical condition should all of a sudden be decisive in the ascription of autonomy and personhood. In view of Frankfurt's free-will internalism, it remains a mystery why conditions 'from the outside' should count in the constitution of autonomy.

In connection with the 'being programmed' case Frankfurt claims that the victim can become autonomous (and morally responsible) in the same way normal other people can, namely "by identifying himself with some of his own second-order desires" (53) which make up his pre-installed character. However, whereas the process of (third-order) identification can be manipulated by the D/n *as well* in the 'being programmed' case, it is not so determined in the normal case. If this process of identification *itself* is also manipulated by either continuous or pre-fixed interference on the part of the D/n, then identification and the resulting second-order volitions intuitively do *not* seem to be within the victim's active control. As against this, Frankfurt holds that second-order volitions—second-order desires with which a person has identified himself—are *necessarily* active: "As for a person's second-order volitions themselves, it is impossible for him to be a passive bystander to them. They *constitute* his activ-

ity—i.e., his being active rather than passive—and the question of whether or not he identifies himself with them cannot arise.” (54) But this bold statement is either arbitrary or illegitimately based upon the belief that second-order volitions are somehow secure against manipulation. For, if Frankfurt’s free-will internalism implicitly appeals to the immunity of second-order volitions to causal interference and thereby revives the ‘noumenal’ self or reissues a person with ‘contra-causal’ freedom, then it even violates the weak naturalistic condition. Now Frankfurt himself later admitted that a person can be as passive—as wanton—with regard to his second-order volitions as with regard to his first-order desires: “The mere fact that one desire occupies a higher level than another in the hierarchy seems plainly insufficient to endow it with greater authority or with any constitutive legitimacy.” (1987, 166) But even if this (regress) problem can be solved in terms of *decisive* identification which constitutes active second-order volitions, the process itself of decisively identifying oneself still can be induced by an external and manipulative agency—i.e., by an intuitively ‘autonomy-thwarting’ mechanism.

## V

Frankfurt is very unwilling to acknowledge that manipulation really poses a problem for his hierarchical model of autonomy. But notwithstanding his reluctance, he himself indirectly suggests, in the course of analysing the concept of *lying* (1991, 5-6), why manipulation intuitively undermines a person’s sense of autonomy. To my mind, if one substitutes “manipulation” for “lie” in the question “When we object to being the victim of a lie, just what is it that we find so objectionable?” (5), a good phenomenological reason can also be given why manipulation undercuts autonomy. Although there are obvious differences between manipulation and lying, their partial analogy is instructive and revealing.

According to Frankfurt, lying does not so much undermine the cohesion of human society as it undercuts *the cohesion of the self*. A victim’s reaction to lying is not social but personal in that lying affronts his pride and self-esteem. Especially the ‘objective’ characteristic of the act of lying is also relevant to the problem of manipulation: “Someone who tells a lie invariably attempts to deceive his victims about [...] the state of affairs to which he explicitly refers and of which he is purporting to give a correct account; [...]” (6) By misrepresenting the facts the liar takes himself to be the creative author of the victim’s world—in terms of our analogy, the liar plays the role of the D/n. The liar “[...] arrogates to himself something like the divine prerogative of creative speech, [...]

*This arrogance offends our pride. We are angered by the liar's insulting effort to usurp control over the conditions in which we understand ourselves to live.*" (Idem; my italics) Hence, the world of the victim of lying is no longer within his control. He can no longer see himself as the independent source of knowledge about the world. Such a predicament undercuts a person's self-esteem because in his understanding of the conditions in which he lives he does not want to be deceived or to be under an illusion about those conditions.

Correspondingly, in as much as being the victim of manipulation is analogous to being the victim of lying, *the arrogance of manipulation* is similarly offensive to a person's sense of autonomy. What we find so objectionable in being the victim of a manipulative mechanism is that the manipulator—the D/n, another person or a machine—usurps control over the conditions in which we understand ourselves to live. This usurpation insultingly undermines our self-respect and thwarts our sense of autonomy. And the only way to find out that we are under no illusion as to our autonomy seems to be a historical or genetic investigation into its (causal) origin. Consequently, the 'inner process' of identification which constitutes autonomy stands in need of outward historical criteria.

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*Autonomy and Externalism*

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Uwe Czaniera

## Gaffer Schwerdtlein's Death A Scientist's Way into metaethical Disaster

MEPHISTOPHELES. O saintly man! Why, here's a coil!  
What, hast thou never yet been driven  
To swear to what you couldst not prove?  
Of God and of the world, and all that therein move,  
Of Man, his heart and mind, his anger, hatred, love,  
Hast not with might and main thy definitions given,  
With brazen front, unfaltering breath?  
And should one sift the matter throughly,  
Thou knew'st as much thereof, confess it truly,  
As now thou know'st of Gaffer Schwerdtleins's death.

*J.W.v.Goethe; Faust I*

(0) We all know the famous last thesis of Wittgenstein's Tractatus: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". At least one intention Wittgenstein seems to have had in mind while writing down this thesis is that it is not possible to articulate a moral judgement that is meaningful in the same sense in which scientific judgements are meaningful. Judgements having cognitive content (like scientific judgements) seemed to be committed to a purely descriptive status. And since moral judgements seemed to be essentially *pre-* and not *de* scriptive, there seemed to be no possibility to regard any given moral judgement as having any cognitive content. This position is known as "ethical noncognitivism" and is elaborated not only by the early Wittgenstein, but also by Ayer, Carnap and Mackie. The question as to whether moral judgements have any cognitive content or not is still debated between philosophers. The actual discussion seems to result in a position that on the one hand acknowledges the "non-factuality" of moral values, but on the other hand maintains that moral questions can be rationally debated. Some main participants in this discussion are Richard Hare, Hilary Putnam, Simon Blackburn and Ken Binmore. But I don't want to concentrate on that philosophical branch of the metaethical discussion. Instead, I want to sketch and to evaluate a metaethical argument put forward not by philosophers but by some scientists who think that we indeed *can* speak whereof "one must be silent". But (presumably) due to a lack of philosophical education, they come up with metaethical conclusions which are untenable. The closer analysis shows that the proposed position is justified as

good as Faust's testimony of Gaffer Schwerdtlein's death. In the remainder I will be concerned with sketching and evaluating that scientist's way into metaethical disaster.

(1) *The Argument*: The promised argument is elaborated, for example, by David Peat and Kalervo Laurikainen. It is usually formulated in an ecological context and its exponents always recur on the work of the physicist Wolfgang Pauli. After being logically reconstructed, the argument seems to consist of the following premises and conclusion:

- P1:** The destruction of the environment is a moral distress threatening us all. We should have another attitude towards nature.
- P2:** Responsible for this destruction is the epistemological and ontological separation of mind and matter which traces back to Descartes.
- P3:** We could redress this destruction if we abolished the separation of mind and matter (without simply reducing mind to matter or *vice versa*).
- P4:** The separation of mind and matter is established and strengthened by the sciences, which have successfully acquired instrumentally usable knowledge of the world under that paradigm.
- P5:** The recent development of the sciences has falsified that paradigm.
- C:** The recent development of the sciences has delivered findings whose acceptance compels to the abandonment of the attitude which is responsible for today's ecological disasters.

We can sum up this argument in the following proposition: A concept of the world, whose acceptance has morally bad consequences, has been falsified and replaced by a concept of the world whose acceptance has morally good consequences; and this moral progress is based on scientific discoveries. To understand this argument, it is necessary to explain its crucial premises **P2** and **P5** in some detail.

(1.1) *The separation of mind and matter*: How can an epistemological and ontological dualism be responsible for ecological disaster? It is argued that this dualism fosters an attitude according to which man and nature are totally separated from each other. Having this dualism in mind, one tends to regard nature as a pure quarry which can be exploited without further reasoning. We come to restrict the set of moral objects to human beings, and everything else *analytically* becomes morally irrelevant.

(1.2) *The reunion of mind and matter*: The cartesian dualism, it is argued, has been overcome by quantum mechanics. The quantum theory is said to show the essential connectedness of the observer and the observed, of mental events in the experimenter and properties of objects. The wave function, which describes the state of a quantum system, yields only probability statements for the outcome of a given experiment. It is only when the experimenter registers the signal of a quantum object that the wave function “collapses” and a sharp value can be read off. Therefore we can say that the person of the experimenter with all its mental qualities determines the properties the quantum object assumes and reveals. These aspects of quantum mechanics show that it is and has always been false to draw a demarcation line between the areas of the mind and the matter.

(1.3) *Restoring value*: After the cartesian dualism has been overcome, we allegedly face a new concept of the world. The application of psychological concepts like “sense”, “meaningfulness” and “value” is no longer restricted to the area of the mental. On the contrary: Since the human mind is able to determine properties of material things, it is adequate to assume that *estimating* the world as valuable means *creating* a world that is valuable. Conceding this, we find ourselves in a situation in which it is inconsistent to regard something as valuable that does not square with the principles of nature.

(2) *Internal criticism*: A first critical access to the argument above can be called “internal”, because it concentrates on single premises of the argument. P1 seems to me to be correct, but not P2.

(2.1) *Exonerating Descartes*: Considering our ecological problems, I think that it is *not* the epistemological and ontological dualism between mind and matter that is responsible, but rather the fact that in normal life *no* such dualism obtains. *Just because* it is easily possible to get into the *mental* state of being satisfied through snatching up *material* things, the condition of the possibility of ecological disaster arises. If there really was a separation of mind and matter, there wouldn't have been any ecological disaster, since we wouldn't have been able to experience any (mental) use of the consumption of (material) resources. There are two possibilities: (1) We can be Cartesians on the ontological and epistemological level. That case leaves all value questions simply untouched, since our moral problems concerning the ecosphere are pragmatical problems. (2) We can (furthermore) be Cartesians on that pragmatical level. On that level Cartesianism (if we meant a strict separation of mind and matter by that term) would immediately collapse because of its obvious falsity. Even Descartes wouldn't have been a Cartesian in that sense, because he saw very clearly that

there is a connection between mind and matter (although it was and is a problem to reconstruct it). So we can make two assertions about **P2**: 1.: A dualism of mind and matter on the *epistemological* and *ontological* level is not responsible for ecological disaster. 2.: A unity of mind and matter on the *pragmatical* level allows the *possibility* of ecological disaster.

The same reasons which lead to the rejection of **P2** lead to the rejection of **P3**. In a certain sense, **P4** may be conceded. As a *de facto* present heuristic principle of the sciences, the dichotomy seems to be accepted. But nevertheless we have to be careful: On epistemological as well as on ontological grounds the separation of mind and matter is heavily attacked (without axiological ambitions). In epistemology, developments during this century seem to have shown that the process of acquiring knowledge is not neutral relative to the previously acquired knowledge. The knowledge we have partially influences the knowledge we are going to discover. We have no cognitive access to the world that is not already contaminated by our knowledge of the world. In ontology, we have for example neurobiological efforts to reduce the area of the mental to the area of material.

(2.2) *Moderating the interpretation of quantum mechanics*: With regard to **P5**, we can remark that a measuring procedure is terminated when the detector registers a signal. But this detector needs not necessarily be equipped with mental properties: It could be a robot or a computer as well. This shows that the mentioned connectedness between the observer and the observed is no connection between mind and matter and *a fortiori* no reunion between them. The proponents of our argument see this, but they reply that a signal has at first to be interpreted, before a statement concerning the measured event can be formulated. This interpretation in turn is a psychic process in the observer; the observer plays no detached role. Acquiring knowledge of the world requires therefore a psychic component — the component of interpretation. We can concede this. But this is no peculiarity of quantum mechanics at all. It holds for the whole enterprise of empirical investigation and is perfectly compatible with our remarks concerning the axiologically neutral criticisms of **P4**. Concerning the resuscitation of the material world, we see that quantum theory makes no contribution.

(2.3) *Micro- and Macro-Level*: A last critical remark on the internal branch may concern **C**. Even if there was a connection between mind and matter specifically revealed by quantum mechanics, we could still say the following: It seems to be clear that value problems concern us on a macroscopical level, on a level where we are to be described as thinking and feeling human beings. They

do not concern us on that microscopical level where we are to be described as complicated quantum systems. So if the quantum effects should have any practical impact, it would be necessary that they occur in our practical life. If we prefer vanilla ice-cream to the strawberry type, it should be possible to turn a strawberry-vanilla-superposition into the vanilla possibility while opening the freezer. But such thoughts are nonsense, not only according to common sense, but especially according to quantum theory. Apart from that, they are useless, since on the practical level there is already no strict separation of mind and matter which could be overcome. Besides, if we lived in such a strange world, the moral problems would presumably be larger and not smaller.

(3) *External Criticism*: A second critical access to our argument can be called “external”, because it concedes the whole argument and highlights the situation which occurs in that case of concession.

(3.1) *Naturalistic Fallacy*: The first thing that would happen if we conceded the argument would be nothing at all. Even if we all agreed that the system of nature “makes sense”, nothing could prevent us from being totally indifferent to the course of nature. The pure fact that there is a kind of “making sense” in the course of nature does not urge anyone to any special kind of behaviour. Quantum mechanics may restore a value-laden nature, but without some imperative component no directive thesis for our practical life follows.

(3.2) *Superabundance of Norms*: We can supply that want and invent an imperative premise. This could run as follows: “Live according to the principles of nature!” But then we get the problem that it is not clear *which* principles should guard us. An imperative of such generality commands everything and nothing. In the sense that we cannot act against the laws of nature, we are *always* living according to the principles of nature. Some parts of the course of nature seem to be dubious models for the moral life: Female spiders which eat their husbands after copulation or the laws governing the rotation of the planets are unsuitable for guarding our moral life. This shows that we need a further selection of principles if we shall be able to make any use of the quantum-based unity of nature.

(3.3) *Counterintuitive Principles*: A near specification of the imperative would be the following: “Live according to the principles of sustaining life!” That sounds good. Here one seems to be able to derive commandments which lead, for example, to the preservation of nature. But on the other side we face principles that have their place in nature, but would seem to be the embodiment of evil when transferred into morals. These are principles of neglecting and refusing the weak and the sick. Nobody would seriously demand that we install

such principles in our system of morals, and this shows again that we have to call upon *external* principles when working out an acceptable system of morals. The course of nature alone is not sufficient to deliver such a system.

It is finally not to see how the peculiarities of quantum mechanics should be of any help in removing ecological disaster apart from the way in which all sciences can help us in moral questions: The knowledge produced by the sciences *can* help us in solving our moral problems in the sense that it can tell us what is possible and what is not possible. It *can not* tell us what is morally good and what is morally bad.

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